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ABSTRACT 
 
 
When the United States offered Ireland the opportunity to join the European 
Recovery Plan (ERP) after World War II, Irish officials and leaders had a unique 
opportunity to move beyond Ireland’s conservative political and economic isolation 
and, with ERP resources, to work towards European integration.  However, extreme 
nationalism and the issue of the partition of Northern Ireland impeded even the most 
forward thinking Irish leaders of the time, like Seán MacBride, from fully realizing the 
opportunity of ERP because these leaders hijacked Marshall Plan propaganda for the 
purpose of promoting their own political, nationalistic agenda.  Even strong proponents 
of European recovery and European integration, like the Irish intellectual Sean 
O’Faolain, were not immune to the pull of Irish nationalism.  O’Faolain’s 1951 
Marshall Plan film The Promise of Barty O’Brien provides an historical and cultural 
lens into Ireland’s struggle between modernization and extreme Irish nationalism, 
which was often isolationist and fervently against the partition of Northern Ireland.  
Despite O’Faolain’s support of ERP, modernization, and integration, the film 
demonstrates a glorification of Ireland’s agrarian and revolutionary past.  Extreme Irish 
nationalism, the failure to break economic ties to the United Kingdom, and demands 
that anti-partition be a condition of membership in NATO alienated both U.S. and 
European officials.  This thesis will expand and contribute to the existing scholarship on 
the ERP and Irish nationalism in the post World War II era because of the analysis of 
diplomatic affairs in connection with unique and significant Marshall Plan films like 
The Promise of Barty O’Brien. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Introduction 
 
During the period of the Marshall Plan, Ireland was paradoxically both 
peripheral and central to the success of European integration and economic recovery 
after World War II.  The country was still producing agriculture for an economically 
devastated United Kingdom and the export of Irish foodstuffs were essential for 
sustaining the wellbeing of both nations.  The complex relationships between the United 
Kingdom and Ireland reveal the paradox of British dependence on Ireland’s economy.  
Despite political autonomy from the British Commonwealth, Ireland, and the United 
Kingdom were codependent in their reliance on the Sterling area and bi-lateral trade.  
The scholarship of this thesis will contribute to the growing body of contemporary 
research on individual European countries involved in the European Recovery Plan 
(ERP).  Specifically, this thesis demonstrates how Ireland’s foreign affairs’ leaders 
manipulated ERP propaganda for the purpose of promoting their own political agenda.  
Although scholarship about ERP propaganda is quite diverse, this thesis will focus on 
specific media in Ireland that used ERP resources for promoting Irish nationalism. 
Tension among the Irish people, the British, and the Americans complicated the postwar 
recovery of Ireland, but the struggle among the Irish actually delayed Ireland’s entrance 
into the European community in the immediate postwar era.  This thesis will 
demonstrate that, despite Irish nationalism and resistance to outside cultural, political 
and economic influence, many Irish officials actively courted external political, and 
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cultural influences, but Ireland ultimately failed to realize the opportunity of ERP 
because Irish leaders used ERP propaganda to implement their own nationalistic 
propaganda to call attention to partition. 
Irish nationalism and the problem of the partition of the northern counties of 
Ireland transected all aspects of Irish life—religious, political, economic, and 
diplomatic.  The Parliament of the United Kingdom gave Ireland home rule when it 
passed the Government of Ireland Act in 1920.  The entire island of Ireland became the 
Irish Free State in 1922.  However, the parliament of Northern Ireland decided to opt-
out (Article 12 of the treaty allowed for an opt-out) of the Irish Free State.  The six 
counties in the north eventually became Northern Ireland under the sovereignty of the 
United Kingdom.  The Irish Free State accepted this provision of partition as temporary.  
The declaration of Ireland as a republic in 1948 widened the effect of partition because 
of Ireland’s neutrality and non-participation in NATO.  Irish External Affairs leader 
Seán MacBride’s strong stance against partition often caused friction with U.S. 
Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) members who believed it was a 
distraction from ERP and European cooperation.   
In 1951, the fictional feature-length film The Promise of Barty O’Brien was 
released and screened in Ireland.  The film tells the story of Barty O’Brien who wanted 
to leave his farm to train as an electrical engineer but was prevented from fulfilling his 
dream by his father who embodied a rural, nationalist, anti-modern viewpoint.  Barty 
fulfills his dream despite his father’s obstinacy by participating in the ERP Technical 
Assistance Program.    Barty O’Brien’s journey is in many ways a metaphor for the 
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desire of the Irish people to modernize in the postwar era while retaining the traditional, 
agricultural legacy of their history. The film addresses the key political, economic, and 
social themes affecting Ireland at the time, particularly the issue of modernization with 
regard to the Technical Assistance Program implemented by the ERP.  Despite 
propaganda and modernization efforts, Ireland failed to fulfill the goals of 
industrialization in the immediate years after World War II.  Technical Assistance aid 
was suspended in 1952, and ECA officials were unimpressed by the political 
grandstanding of Irish leaders like Seán MacBride.  The film is important, though, 
because Barty’s plight was representative of the tension present in Ireland’s quest for 
identity after independence in the modern age of the ERP (or Marshall Plan).1   The film 
is a lens into the Irish experience of ERP and Barty’s struggle is a metaphor for the Irish 
people’s struggle between traditional values and modernizing Ireland.  Barty O’Brien, 
like Irish officials of the day, was torn between fulfilling his role as farmer and 
becoming a modern electrical engineer by participating in the American ERP Technical 
Assistance Program.  Like Barty, Irish officials were conflicted between clinging to the 
traditional agricultural, economic isolation of Ireland’s past and interacting with and 
accepting foreign economic and cultural resources. 
 The chapters of the thesis are organized by topics that illustrate not only the 
background of the ERP and Ireland, but also the complex relationships involved in the 
push for modernization and integration.  The initial chapter focuses on the background 
of the ERP and Ireland, including the historiography concerning the Marshall Plan in 
                                                 
1 I will use the terms “ERP,” “European Recovery Plan”, and “Marshall Plan” 
interchangeably throughout the thesis. 
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general and Ireland, specifically.  Historiography concerning Irish nationalism is 
explored in the second chapter.  Traditionally, scholarship on the European Recovery 
Program involved the complicated bilateral relationship between the European nations 
and the United States, particularly in the context of the Cold War.  Only recently have 
scholars begun to explore the ERP in a wider, more nuanced context, involving not only 
Cold War politics, but inter-European relations as well.  Attention is now being paid to 
the smaller nations—particularly Ireland.  Ireland is significant in the context of the 
Marshall Plan and the post World War II era for several reasons.  First of all, Ireland 
was a neutral nation during World War II.  This exacerbated an already complex 
relationship with the United Kingdom after the war.  In 1948, Ireland was officially 
declared a republic, thus terminating the identity of the nation in relation to its 
connection with the British Commonwealth.  However, Ireland continued to be 
dependent on Britain economically.  After the declaration of the republic, the partition 
of Northern Ireland was solidified.  Partition became an important issue for the Irish not 
only because they believed a part of Ireland was taken from them, but also because they 
lost the industrialized, prosperous north to the British. 
In the first chapter, I will explore the background on the ERP and Ireland and 
focus on the historiography of the subject.  I will trace the scholarship of the Marshall 
Plan from its original focus on the achievements of the plan to the revisionist theory that 
the United States was simply imposing its own hegemony on the rest of Europe by 
applying foreign aid in order to create an international capitalist system that would 
reinforce the economy of the U.S.  The post-revisionists refute this theory by taking a 
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more complex look at the variant relationships of all nations and peoples involved in 
ERP.  I will then discuss the current scholarship on the Marshall Plan with regard to 
Ireland.  The background on the ERP and the historical problems associated with 
Ireland and the Marshall Plan will provide a context for the propaganda campaign 
implemented by Seán MacBride and the Department of External Affairs and the film 
The Promise of Barty O’Brien.   
 The film The Promise of Barty O’Brien was one of many films issued by the 
ECA to promote the Marshall Plan.  However, the film is unique in that it is a full-
length feature film that is a fictional piece of art in addition to being a propaganda 
piece.  The film was written by the famous Irish writer Sean O’Faolain and was 
comprised of mostly Irish actors and crew.  The Marshall Plan films like The Promise of 
Barty O’Brien have only recently become available.  Albert Hemsing, who was an 
American member of the Information Division in Paris in the 1950s, recounted how 
difficult it was to get Congress to lift the ban on the screening of the Marshall Plan’s 
propaganda films in America.   The prohibition against the Marshall films originated in 
the Smith-Mundt Act, United States Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948.  
Even when Congress officially lifted the ban on the screening of the films in 1990, most 
of the public, including scholars, have had limited access to the films.2  While most of 
                                                 
2 Elizabeth Heffelfinger, “Foreign Policy, Domestic Fiction:  Government-
sponsored Documentaries and Network Television Promote the Marshall Plan at 
Home,” Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television 28, no. 1 (March 2008), 3.  
The Smith-Mundt act is also known as the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange 
Act and was passed in 1948.  The act was created to distribute pro-U.S. and anti-Soviet 
propaganda around the globe.  The act stipulated that no propaganda would be 
disseminated in the United States as a protective measure for the American people.  The 
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the films are attainable through the National Archives II in College Park, Maryland, it is 
difficult and expensive to obtain a copy for individual viewing, much less a film 
screening.  However, the Marshall Plan films from the European Unit are a rich primary 
source for understanding this era.  The film The Promise of Barty O’Brien is 
particularly interesting because it was not only a propaganda film extolling the virtues 
of the Marshall Plan, but it was also a full-length fictional feature film written by a 
prominent Irish writer and endorsed by the Irish Department of External Affairs.  In 
many ways this American propaganda film was an Irish-issued and approved 
propaganda film as well.  Significantly, the struggle of Barty O’Brien in the film 
mirrors the struggle of many Irish people and Irish officials, who were caught between 
clinging to traditional values versus exploring modernization and closer ties to the 
United States. 
In the third chapter, I will explain how the ambivalent relationships with the 
United Kingdom and the United States impeded Ireland’s quest for integration with 
Europe.  Ireland’s refusal to sever the bilateral economic ties to Britain along with its 
attempt to remove itself culturally and politically from Britain are evidence of the 
ambivalent relationship the country had with its neighbor during the postwar years.  
While Ireland had a history of friendly and amicable relationships with America, many 
Irish officials were wary of adopting the ERP because of a concern over the influx of 
what they viewed as crass American materialism, cultural insensitivity, and haste.  
                                                                                                                                               
Marshall Plan films were finally available for viewing in the United States in 1990 
when Massachusetts Senator John Kerry introduced an amendment to the act to allow 
for the Marshall Plan films to be screened in the U.S. 
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Chapters four and five will reveal how the expansion of the Department of 
External Affairs allowed the department to play a key role in Ireland’s foray into 
international affairs, but the department’s hijacking of ERP propaganda for the purpose 
of anti-partition propaganda alienated U.S. officials.  The Economic Cooperation 
Administration (ECA) functioned as the administrative agency charged with monitoring 
how Marshall Plan funds were being implemented.  The ECA worked with the local 
information divisions in the European countries to implement pro-American, pro-
Marshall plan propaganda through radio, newspapers, exhibitions and film.  Although 
the Department of External Affairs worked to publicize ERP, they did so according to 
their own political agenda by making the problem of partition an issue in propaganda 
media.            
This thesis is arranged by the specific areas of tension resulting in Ireland’s 
failure to integrate in the new world order envisioned by planners and most participants 
of ERP.  The exploration of the Department of External Affairs and the film The 
Promise of Barty O’Brien will add to scholarship based on recently released and newly 
discovered media relating to the Marshall Plan and ERP.  The film must be viewed 
within these contexts:  Ireland’s complicated relationship with Britain and the United 
States, its status of neutrality during the war, a push by some individuals to integrate 
with Europe and modernize Irish economics and culture into a more industrial society 
like the United States, and its quest to provide a fresh vision for itself as a new nation in 
the post-World War II new world era. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
History and Historiography of the European Recovery Plan and Ireland 
 
This chapter addresses the complex history of the ERP and the evolution of its 
historiography.  Even though the Americans concocted the concept of the Marshall 
Plan, the Europeans created and implemented the official European Recovery Program.  
European recovery involved economic improvement through technical assistance, 
removing trade barriers including tariffs, and increasing consumerism.  It was also a 
way to curtail the perceived encroachment of communism into Western Europe.  The 
initial historiography of the Marshall Plan focused on European success as a result of 
American funding, resources and ingenuity.  Scholars held a very American-centric 
view and did not initially incorporate the complex interactions between the European 
nations and individuals.  Historians later began to look at the multilateral relationships 
between European countries within the context of the Marshall Plan.  Recent 
historiography reflects a more nuanced approach that transects social, political, and 
economic spheres.  Complex relationships existed among individuals, multilateral 
institutions, and countries.  The problems of these complex relationships were 
compounded by issues of cultural and political nationalism, which both motivated the 
Irish ERP players and hindered them in their quest for opportunities through ERP 
resources.  This chapter will provide background on the European Recovery Program 
and reveal how the research of this thesis fits into contemporary scholarship.   
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The ERP’s goal was not only to help Europe recover from the economic 
devastation of World War II, but it would also provide a stronghold against the threat of 
totalitarian regimes.  Although Ireland did not face a significant threat from anti-
democratic regimes, the economy of the nation was important for British economic 
success and, therefore, Ireland was awarded ERP funding in the form of both loans and 
grants.  The Marshall Plan’s dual goals of economic recovery and providing a 
stronghold against communist regimes will provide a context for highlighting the ways 
in which Irish leaders attempted to align themselves with these goals while promoting 
their own political agenda of anti-partition. 
 The European Recovery Plan did not begin as a cohesive plan at all, but rather a 
speech by George C. Marshall at Harvard University in June 1947. Although the idea of 
providing Europe with a system of economic restructuring and stability in order to 
prevent another major war was not new, Marshall’s speech marked a moment in time 
when key U.S. officials had deliberately decided to take action to restructure Europe 
and provide resources including financial aid. In the late 1940s, during the height of the 
Marshall Plan, the U.S. provided 60 percent of the world’s foreign aid.  In addition to 
the economic devastation of World War II, the threat of communism was a major 
impetus for implementing foreign funding on such a grand scale.  In his speech, 
Marshall claimed “the remedy lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the 
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confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and 
Europe as a whole.”3   
President Truman and Undersecretary of State Dean Acheson supported George 
C. Marshall’s vision of providing economic resources to Europe in order to prevent the 
spread of communism and avoid another global war.  In March, three months before 
Marshall’s speech to the graduates at Harvard, President Truman issued the Truman 
Doctrine, which stated that the U.S. would provide both Greece and Turkey with 
military and economic aid in their fight against the communist Soviets.  Truman 
presented his doctrine to a joint-session of Congress on March 12, 1947.  The President 
explained the reasons why he requested military support and money for Greece and 
Turkey.  Truman and other U.S. officials believed that without intervention in Greece 
and Turkey, the free peoples of the Western world might succumb to totalitarian and, 
specifically, communist regimes.  Truman believed the United States should take a lead 
role in the development of peaceful nations through the organization of the United 
Nations, which would  
make possible lasting freedom and independence for all its members. We 
shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help 
free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity 
against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian 
regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian 
regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, 
                                                 
3 George C. Marshall, “George C. Marshall’s Marshall Plan Speech in June 
1947,” Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org [accessed January 17, 2008]. 
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undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security 
of the United States.4  
 
Although the speech is specifically a call to action to provide help to Greece and 
Turkey, the speech also implies that U.S. assistance will provide a bulwark against 
totalitarian regimes everywhere and that support will be given, not only in the interest 
of peace, but also to protect U.S. security.  And the international body of the United 
Nations would play a key role in maintaining peace and protecting democracy.  
International organizations like the U.N. and cooperative nations involved in European 
recovery would provide a stronghold against the threat of democracy.  The Truman 
Doctrine became the first of many efforts on behalf of the U.S. government to contain 
communism and provide peace and security in the world.  Truman is explicit in 
explaining the ways in which the United States will support those threatened when he 
exclaims 
I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free 
peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or 
by outside pressures.  I believe that we must assist free peoples to work 
out their own destinies in their own way.  I believe that our help should 
be primarily through economic and financial aid which is essential to 
economic stability and orderly political processes.5  
 
U.S. assistance in the postwar era would not only involve military resources to fight 
communism and totalitarian regimes, but it would also include (to some extent) 
financial funding in order to prevent the aggression by non-democratic governments 
                                                 
4 Harry S. Truman, “President Harry S. Truman’s address before a joint session 
of Congress, March 12, 1947,” Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org 
[accessed January 17, 2008]. 
 
5 Ibid. 
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against sovereign democratic states.  U.S. officials created the Marshall Plan based on 
the concept that the free people of Europe needed economic, political, and military 
protection so that they would not fall victim to the Soviets.  While the focus of 
economic, political, and military protection fell on nations like France and Germany 
because of their vulnerability during both World War I and World War II, it is 
significant that a neutral and more peripheral nation like Ireland would receive aid.  
However, Ireland’s economy was intertwined with Europe, specifically Britain, and 
U.S. officials wanted to offer the goal of European recovery to all European nations. 
 Initially, the Marshall Plan was simply theoretical and, therefore, was not a 
cohesive plan containing a timeline and budget for the distribution of aid.  U.S. officials 
were adamant from the beginning that Europe would be involved in the creation, 
adaptation, and implementation of a plan to improve their economy and provide a 
system of working together.  Secretary Marshall insisted the Europeans would 
collaborate in the implementation of the plan.  In his speech, Marshall notes  
it would be neither fitting nor efficacious for this government to 
undertake to draw up unilaterally a program designed to place Europe on 
its feet economically.  This is the business of Europeans.  The initiative, I 
think, must come from Europe.  The role of this country should consist 
of friendly aid in the drafting of a European program and of later support 
of such a program so far as it may be practical for us to do so.  The 
program should be a joint one, agreed to by a number, if not all, 
European nations.6 
 
After Marshall’s speech, U.S. officials believed it was more important to notify the 
Europeans of this plan before they informed the Americans. When Marshall’s speech 
                                                 
6 George C. Marshall, “George C. Marshall’s Marshall Plan Speech in June 
1947,” Truman Library, http://www.trumanlibrary.org [accessed January 17, 2008]. 
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was presented at Harvard, the press was not even present.  This might have been a 
strategic choice by officials to contain and control the distribution of information, 
particularly to the American press.  However, Dean Acheson was dispatched 
immediately after the speech to contact the European media, in particular the British 
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), with news of the plan.  Acheson realized the 
importance of spreading the news of the plan to the Europeans first and foremost, 
because he expected there might be resistance to what the Europeans might perceive as 
American intervention.  Acheson wanted to notify the Europeans of the Marshall Plan 
as soon as possible so that the initiative for the plan would come from them and not 
simply be a U.S. imposed operation.  He also wanted to get European support, before 
calling on Congress and the American people to provide funding to Europe.  Acheson 
also realized that he would be facing a resistant Congress when he asked for monies to 
support Europe, but if he could approach Congress with European support it might 
provide some leverage to get Congress to comply.  Leonard Miall, a BBC 
correspondent, attended a luncheon with Acheson in the United States a few days before 
Marshall’s speech.  In a 1977 interview with Miall conducted by Marshall Foundation 
Librarian Barbara Vandegrift, Miall discusses Acheson’s influence in getting the word 
out regarding the Marshall Plan—both to the European community and to Congress.  
When asked whether or not Acheson engaged in a “calculated leak” regarding U.S. aid 
to Europe and abroad, Miall says, 
Well, yes and no. There was certainly a "calculated leak" in the sense 
that he was very strongly stressing to us the fact that the response must 
come from Europe, that there must be a European initiative. He said that 
he and his colleagues had been up to The Hill far too often with panaceas 
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for the economic ills of Europe. First, there had been UNRRA, and then 
the British Loan, and then the Truman Doctrine, one thing after another 
and each time they promised this was going to bring us peace in our 
time, and prosperity, and each time it had failed to do so.7 
Acheson was very much aware that Congress was not in the mood to support another 
dose of what the economizers in Congress would call "Operation Rathole", because the 
congressional elections in the fall of 1946 had resulted in a strong Republican majority 
in both houses who were concerned with the budget. There was not a "calculated leak" 
in either of these senses.8  Miall explains how Acheson, at the luncheon on June 2, 
revealed the policies of the Marshall Plan to the European journalists a few days before 
Marshall’s speech.  As a correspondent in Washington, D.C., Miall was able to get an 
advanced copy of Marshall’s speech and was surprised to see the similarities in 
Acheson’s discussions of U.S. policy at the luncheon and the speech. It was clear that 
U.S. officials had a cohesive and somewhat united idea of what European recovery 
might entail and they were adamant that the Europeans were notified before the 
American people so that their participation in the plan would be self-chosen and not 
simply be imposed by a foreign entity.  This was extremely significant for smaller 
countries like Ireland who, for the first time, were able to enter the international arena 
and participate with other European countries on a grand scale of recovery and possible 
                                                 
7 Barbara Vandegrift, George C. Marshall Foundation, “BBC Correspondent 
Leonard Miall and the Marshall Plan Speech: An Interview,” George C. Marshall 
Foundation, http://www.marshallfoundation.org/library [accessed January 17, 2008].  
Marshall Foundation Librarian Barbara Vandegrift interviewed Mr. Miall on September 
19, 1977 at the library in Lexington, Virginia. 
 
8 Ibid. 
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integration. 
 Once the Europeans were notified of the speech, the U.S. actively campaigned 
for European acceptance of the Marshall Plan concept.  The plan needed to be approved 
by the Europeans and eventually Congress before it became official.  After several 
meetings of European nations in Paris, the Europeans sent a reconstruction plan, which 
they developed, to Washington.  After the resistance of some members of Congress in 
accepting the plan, it was ultimately passed, and President Truman signed it into law on 
April 3, 1948.  Once the plan was approved, the ECA was created to carry out the plan.  
ECA officials would work closely with European officials.  In Ireland, the ECA would 
develop a complex relationship with Irish leaders, particularly in the Department of 
External Affairs. 
 The first administrator of the ECA was Paul Hoffman.  Hoffman believed 
deeply in the Marshall Plan’s goal of combating communism.  He also felt that the 
United States “as the leader of the free world… must by deeds and words make clear to 
all peoples our devotion to the idea of a free, peaceful and more ample life for all 
men.”9  It is quite fitting that Hoffman, a former car salesman and president of the 
Studebaker car company, was named the first administrator of the ECA.  It would take a 
car salesman not only to sell the idea of European recovery via U.S. financial assistance 
to the Europeans, but also to the Americans—particularly the American taxpayer.   
 Before the ECA took over, the State Department was in charge of the ERP 
structure.  The State Department’s vision included a need to see Europe   
                                                 
9 Paul Hoffman, Peace Can Be Won (New York:  Doubleday 1951), 125. 
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increase in production, expand foreign trade, lower or remove all barriers 
to the free movement of trade and commerce and peoples, achieve 
financial stability and realize European unity.  In other words the United 
States envisaged a United States of Europe in order to remake the old 
world in the likeness of the new.10 
This idea of remaking Europe into a model like the United States—democratic and 
capitalistic—became the focus of the Marshall Plan during this time.  There was a push, 
both by the Americans and the Europeans, for the lifting of trade barriers and tariffs and 
a move towards European integration.  Free trade, lower tariffs, and increased 
production would prevent European countries from gravitating towards more extreme 
socialist, even communist, institutions with economic and political isolation from the 
rest of Europe and the world.11 
 While many European diplomats and foreign affairs leaders were excited about 
the potential of European Recovery, some Europeans reacted with ambivalence when 
confronted with the Marshall Plan.   Many Europeans believed that American officials 
underestimated European leaders’ ability to recover from the physical, emotional, and 
economic devastation caused by two successive world wars.  However, most European 
countries gladly accepted money, in terms of both grants and loans, from U.S. officials 
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in order to boost their country’s ability to recover from the economic devastation of the 
war.   Europeans perceived the ERP as a potential threat to their sovereignty; and, yet, 
many believed the plan would be a way to bring Europe back from the brink.  Henry 
Kissinger, a German-born American political scientist, who understood the European 
perspective because of his background and knowledge of European political history, 
later acknowledged the disconnect between Europe and the U.S. at the founding of the 
ERP because the Americans 
failed to recall the European dynamism which had launched the 
Industrial Revolution, the political philosophy which had spawned the 
concept of national sovereignty, or the European style of diplomacy 
which had operated a complex balance of power system for some three 
centuries.12 
 
Many Europeans were wary and critical of the idea that the U.S. was going to save 
Europe from economic and political downfall.  Europeans were keenly aware that the 
United States did not invent democracy or industrialization.  After all, the Europeans 
first conceived democracy in Greece and expanded the concept in England.  And the 
first industrial revolution evolved in Europe.  Some Irish leaders would use this 
argument against U.S. officials because they feared the encroachment of U.S. culture 
which they viewed as crass.  They mistrusted the idea that U.S. leaders would be the 
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saviors of Europeans, who were quite capable despite the desperate conditions 
following the war. 
Therefore, when the United States began to promote the Marshall Plan, many 
Europeans, including the Irish, reacted with ambivalence.  At the time of ERP, the 
Department of External Affairs was the foreign affairs and diplomatic department of 
Ireland.  The Department was comprised of a dynamic group of forward-thinking 
diplomats and individuals who, for the most part, welcomed the ERP and the ECA 
officials stationed in Ireland.  This openness to the ERP by External Affairs contrasts 
with the Department of Finance, which was less eager to dissolve the current economic 
structure where Ireland was dependent on the Sterling dollar and traded almost 
exclusively with the United Kingdom.  The Marshall Plan was also attacked by groups 
such as the Irish Worker League, an Irish communist party who were against the 
capitalism of the U.S., and by Irish nationalists and individuals among the Irish 
intellectual elite who feared the ERP would lead to a contamination of culture by the 
U.S. because they perceived the U.S. as secular, pagan, and materialistic.  
 Scholarship regarding the Marshall Plan is diverse and complex because there 
were so many players involved in one of the most complicated and expensive 
international programs ever implemented.  In many ways, the historiography of the ERP 
has evolved from an American-centric perspective to a Euro-centric perspective.  Now, 
scholars are looking at the Marshall Plan through the lens of specific nations, such as 
Ireland.  Ireland may seem like a seemingly insignificant player in the international 
game of postwar Europe, but it is important.  In many ways, it shared a symbiotic 
 19 
economic relationship with the United Kingdom.  Economic success in Britain 
depended heavily on Irish economic success—particularly through the mass production 
of agriculture which was exported to the people of the United Kingdom.  The United 
Kingdom would have been in a desperate economic situation after the war without Irish 
agricultural imports.  However, the unique situation of Ireland—a western European 
country and, yet, a former colony of the United Kingdom—created enormous tension 
between these two economically intertwined entities.  Because of this historical tension 
with the United Kingdom, Ireland utilized the ERP to advance its nationalistic cause.13  
This is significant because Irish nationalism, used in the guise of ERP propaganda, 
caused a rift with the ECA and U.S. officials.14  Scholarship on the Marshall Plan has 
evolved from looking at the economic success of Europe after the implementation of 
ERP to exploring the individual countries involved in, and affected by, ERP.  
While historians are divided on the extent to which the Marshall Plan affected 
European economic recovery and integration, most scholars of the Marshall Plan in the 
1950s and 1960s argued that the plan was an immediate success and a great 
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achievement since most Western European countries were able to make a remarkable 
economic recovery after the war.  In 1955, Harry B. Price praised the achievements of 
the Marshall Plan in his work The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning.  The work was 
comprised of interviews with Marshall Plan officials such as General George C. 
Marshall, Secretary of State; George F. Kennan, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, 
State Department; Harold Stein, Head, Washington Office, Committee for the Marshall 
Plan; and Francis Wilcox, Chief of Staff, and Senate Foreign Relations Committee.15 
The problem with Price’s research on the Marshall Plan was twofold.  First of all, while 
he interviewed many individuals, the majority of the individuals that he interviewed 
were U.S. officials.  A more thorough investigation of Marshall Plan success should 
have included the perspectives of more European officials.  Secondly, the interviews 
were conducted in 1952 and 1953, barely enough time to rate the success or failure of a 
vast economic recovery program that began as a speech in 1947, only five years before 
the first interviews were conducted. 
Indeed, most of the early scholarship from the 1950s and 1960s on the Marshall 
Plan focused on the success of European economic recovery because of the generosity 
and ingenuity of the United States.  In many ways the early scholarship included an 
American-centric perspective and was very pro-U.S. in terms of interpreting the success 
of the ERP.  However, in the 1960s and 1970s, revisionist historians challenged whether 
European economic success was based on U.S. ingenuity and resources alone.  Some 
                                                 
15 Harry B. Price, The Marshall Plan and Its Meaning (Ithaca, New York:  
1955). 
 
 21 
scholars even claimed that the motives of U.S. officials were not altruistic when they 
implemented the plan in Europe.  In discussing the Marshall Plan in the context of the 
Cold War, some revisionists claimed the United States used the war and European 
recovery in order to advance economic and political domination.  Gabriel and Joyce 
Kolko accused the United States of outright imperialism because the U.S. took 
advantage of a weak Europe in order to exploit the continent to the advantage of the 
U.S. economy. They explored the social history of the diplomatic aspect of foreign 
policy in the years after the Marshall Plan and offered an extremely negative 
interpretation of U.S. intentions.16 This view could be reduced to “economic 
determinism” according to the scholar Bruce Cumings, and is limiting in that it does not 
take into account the active participation, motivations, and decisions by foreign nations 
and individuals.17  Postrevisionists, like John Lewis Gaddis, attacked this argument, 
stating that revisionists like Kolko concentrated too much on economics and ignored 
political, social, and cultural motivations.18  However, many European officials, 
including the members of the Irish Department of External Affairs, actively courted 
U.S. monies and aid. 
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Unlike the revisionists, Scott Jackson contributed to the historical scholarship of 
the Marshall Plan in 1979 by taking a more nuanced approach and exploring the diverse 
motivations of individuals.  He interpreted the events by investigating the Marshall Plan 
in the context of the following:  American generosity, the context of the Cold War, and 
as a means to sustain the international economy at the end of World War II.19  His 
approach also differed from the scholars before him because he explored the complex 
motivations and relationships of governments and government agencies involved.  
Rather than looking at the implementation and success rates of programs and 
institutions, Jackson explored the individual players and their effect on the Marshall 
Plan.  Jackson’s interpretation of the Marshall Plan also reflects a shift among some 
historians from examining primarily U.S. officials’ motivations and American 
perceptions to researching a variety of perspectives:  Russian, British among others.   
Jackson explains how, in 1947, a complex network of motivation emerged.  He 
discusses how the decisions made by disparate officials in the White House, Paris, and 
Moscow revealed “deep and widespread currents of thinking.”20        
Jackson’s interpretation differs widely from that of John Gimbel, who claimed 
that the Marshall Plan officials were not concerned with European economic recovery 
or the containment of communism; instead they created the Marshall Plan and ERP in 
order to deal with a disjointed Germany.  Gimbel claimed that the ERP’s purpose was 
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not to inject the entire European economy with an economic stimulus shot, but the plan 
was actually intended to build up the German economy specifically.21  Gimbel’s narrow 
interpretation of the Marshall Plan is contrasted with scholars such as Jackson who saw 
the complexity in motivations and relationships of those involved.  Because such a 
diverse group of Americans and Europeans created the program of the Marshall Plan, 
such a singular purpose with regard to Germany was not possible.  
 A postrevisionist interpretation of the Marshall Plan emerged in the 1980s and 
1990s.  The postrevisionist reaction developed as a result of newly released archives. 
Although John Lewis Gaddis did not invent the term post-revisionism, his writings on 
the Cold War in the 1970s and 1980s prompted an ongoing debate among scholars.  
Gaddis demanded a more thoughtful approach to studying the complexities of the Cold 
War and called on scholars to provide a more sophisticated analysis of what the 
revisionists called U.S. imperialism.22  He attacked the revisionist historians by advising 
them to rely more on archives than their own whims—such as suggesting U.S. leaders 
convinced the American people to advance Cold War ideology for the purpose of U.S. 
imperialism.  Bruce Cumings reacted to Gaddis’ argument by claiming that Gaddis was 
not a postrevisionist at all but an “antirevisionist”, because while he lambasted the 
revisionists, he still clung to the original Cold War orthodox views from the previous 
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generation.23  Despite Cumings critique of Gaddis, Gaddis would eventually become 
one of the most important Cold War scholars to date.  Gaddis continues to argue against 
the idea that U.S. imperialism alone was the impetus for the Marshall Plan and U.S. 
involvement in Europe after World War II.  He claims that the differences between the 
political structures of the totalitarianism of the Soviet Union versus the democratic 
government of the United States affected the degree and control they wielded over other 
nations.  Gaddis argues that U.S. leaders believed the function of government was to 
facilitate freedom, and although the U.S. might help regulate the economy in Europe 
through resources and funding, they did not, like the Soviet Union, control all aspects of 
it.24  Geir Lundestad distinguished the United States’ empire from that of other 
totalitarian regimes by indicating that the United States’ empire was an “empire by 
invitation.”  In other words, rather than imposing its will on other nations, Americans 
built their empire based on American values of democracy and free-will therefore 
allowing a certain amount of autonomy and independence for other nations under the 
umbrella of hegemony of the U.S.25 Although scholars disagree about the motivations 
and the intentions with regard to imperialism, some Europeans were wary of U.S. 
intentions when they implemented the ERP.  As a result of newly available government 
archives, post-revisionist historians like Sallie Pisani utilized new archival material to 
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provide a different interpretation of the Marshall Plan.  In a 1991 study of the Marshall 
Plan administration and the Office of Policy Coordination (later the Central Intelligence 
Agency), Pisani demonstrates how U.S. officials used the Marshall Plan for covert 
interventionist purposes to combat communism.26 
Another ongoing debate among historians was the degree of success of the 
Marshall Plan.  Some scholars, such as Immanuel Wexler, claimed that the ERP was 
actually a success based on data that revealed a rise in European production and trade.  
However, he describes how the ERP fell short of achieving total financial stability and 
European integration as a whole.27  Others, such as Alan Milward, challenged the idea 
that the Marshall Plan was even a success.  Milward argued that Europe would have 
recovered eventually with or without the aid of the Americans.28  Michael J. Hogan 
attacked Milward’s argument by stating that there was no way that the Americans could 
foresee the eventual economic recovery of Europe, with or without their help.29  But 
what Milward was attempting to do was to compare the United States’ vision of 
European economic and political integration versus what actually happened and even 
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what could have happened without U.S. intervention.  This vision, where the U.S. used 
its own nineteenth century framework of economic and political unification as a model 
for European recovery, underestimated Europe’s ability to recover economically and 
maintain political stability with or without U.S. help.  In many ways Hogan and 
Milward are both correct.  Milward was attempting to shatter the syllogism that 
American economic aid leads to European recovery.  American ERP, like Hogan 
suggests, did provide Europe with a foundation to build on, but Hogan often presents 
the Europeans as passive recipients of the generosity of the Americans rather than 
active members and decision makers in their own recovery effort. 
 In the 1990s, historians such as David Ellwood looked at the specific methods 
used by the U.S. to promote growth and productivity.  Ellwood discusses the 
reinvention of American power in the context of a post-World War II and Cold War 
world, but he also challenges the notion that Marshall Aid policies and programs alone 
led to European economic recovery.  Ellwood suggests that intra-European exports are 
what led to the European Economic Community (EEC) in March 1957 and, ultimately, 
the European Union (EU) in 1993.  The American push for growth, the breaking down 
of trade barriers and European integration were important, but not as important as the 
Europeans ultimately choosing of their own volition to work together.30  While the 
historiography of the Marshall Plan from the 1950s to the 1980s was American-centered 
and focused on the success or failure of Marshall Aid to the Europeans, Ellwood and 
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others began to look at Marshall Aid from the perspective of the Europeans within their 
own context of economic stability and integration.   
Recent writing on the Marshall Plan has moved beyond merely analyzing the 
American-European bilateral relationship.  Contemporary scholars are researching the 
individuals and institutions of specific nations involved in, and affected by, the ERP.  
Scholars of Ireland and the Marshall Plan are shifting their focus from analyzing the 
bilateral Irish-American economic aid relationship and looking at the multi-lateral 
relationships that affected the ERP outcome.  The emerging literature shows the 
importance of placing the Irish experience in its wider European context.  In Raymond 
J. Raymond’s groundbreaking work, he discussed the improbable fact that Ireland was 
considered for Marshall Plan Aid at all because of the country’s neutral position during 
World War II.  Because of Ireland’s position during the war and its marginal place 
alongside the European powerhouse countries like the United Kingdom, it is remarkable 
that Ireland was even considered at all in the American plan for European integration 
and economic stimulus.31   
The most recent scholarship on Ireland and the ERP comes from the 
publications of Irish ERP scholars.  In the 1990s and beyond, scholars from Ireland and 
other European countries have united to discuss the relevance and importance of 
Ireland’s role in the postwar recovery of Europe.  Modern scholars are discussing the 
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history of Ireland’s involvement in the ERP by viewing the plan through several lenses:  
the Irish government’s complicated political and economic relationship with the United 
Kingdom, Ireland’s relationship with other European countries, and Ireland’s internal 
struggle among different factions in Irish government and society who disagreed on 
what type of postwar, twentieth century vision Ireland should adopt for the country. 
Bernadette Whelan has written the most comprehensive study of Ireland and 
ERP in her work Ireland and the Marshall Plan, 1947-57.  Whelan traces the origins of 
the U.S. invitation to Ireland to join the ERP, its involvement in the Organization for 
European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the establishment of the plan, the loans 
versus grant issue of Marshall Aid, and the push for productivity, production, publicity, 
and propaganda in Ireland.  Whelan’s scholarship is important because the story of Irish 
involvement in the Marshall Plan has never been fully explained.  Most ERP scholars 
have a narrow focus when interpreting the ERP and Ireland, concentrating on just 
economic or social or political issues.  But, Whelan argues, Ireland’s involvement in 
ERP warranted a large study because it transects the economic, social, political, and 
diplomatic history during the postwar decade.32  Whelan’s work presents a 
comprehensive study of the path to economic recovery and European integration for 
Ireland in the years of ERP.  Whelan has also tackled more specific issues involving 
Ireland and the ERP.  She has written extensively on the publicity and propaganda of 
the Marshall Plan, particularly with regard to the defense and the containment of 
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communism. Initially, the ERP propaganda was supposed to focus on selling the 
Marshall Plan to the Europeans, but increasingly and specifically after the outbreak of 
the Korean War in 1950, ERP propaganda began to emphasize the importance of 
prosperity and peace as a defense against communism.  Whelan asserts that, in many 
ways, the implementation of the Marshall Plan did not alter the outlook of Irish officials 
when it came to neutrality, pacifism, and partition.  She states that “Ireland was neutral 
and partitioned when the Marshall Plan began, and it remained so when the plan 
ended.”33  This thesis will build upon Whelan’s work by looking at specific propaganda 
media, such as The Promise of Barty O’Brien, in demonstrating how Irish officials 
prioritized the issue of partition above integration, industrialization, and consumer 
prosperity. 
 Whelan and other contemporary Irish historians are divided regarding Irish 
economic success and the rate of adaptation to the goals of the ERP.  Troy Davis argues 
that Irish nationalist commentators have tended to treat official Washington as an 
extension of British government.  Davis asserts that this view has led many nationalist 
historians to be critical of American Cold War policy decisions involving Ireland.  
Davis claims that the U.S. policies were not necessarily anti-Irish and pro-British.  He 
suggests that issues such as partition tended to alienate the U.S. and the rest of Europe.  
He also argues that Washington could not be anti-Irish and pro-British since it did not 
even have a specific Irish policy because Ireland was not considered a major contender 
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or even ally in the Cold War.34  Whelan disagrees with Davis by demonstrating that 
there was a concerted effort by U.S. officials to treat Ireland as a “less favoured nation” 
by giving the majority of the Marshall Aid in the form of loans and not grants.35  This 
thesis will demonstrate how Irish officials alienated U.S. officials by manipulating ERP 
propaganda in order to promote their own anti-partition agenda.  Because of Ireland’s 
neutrality during World War II and since Ireland was a less important figure in Europe 
and in the Cold War, Ireland was not given the same priority as the United Kingdom.  
However, because Irish officials continually emphasized Irish nationalism and the 
problem of partition in ERP propaganda, they further alienated ECA and U.S. officials. 
 Contemporary historians challenge the extent to which Irish officials embraced 
integration and the push for mass consumerism and industrialization in the 1940s and 
1950s. Regarding industrialization and consumerism, Whelan acknowledges the tension 
among the Irish who grappled with their love of American goods and media, but also 
despised the American propagation of “pagan, materialistic and hedonistic values.”36 
Till Geiger, in reviewing recently released archival material, concluded that the Irish 
policy makers became concerned that the United States would pressure Ireland to end 
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its longstanding policy of economic nationalism.37  However, Whelan emphasizes the 
importance of the Marshall Plan in ending Ireland’s self-imposed isolation because of 
neutrality during the war.  Whelan argues that Irish involvement in the ERP revealed a 
step toward an Europeanization of Irish foreign policy.  Although Whelan recounts the 
reluctance of Irish officials to join the ERP, she notes that it was a crucial decision in 
the long run for Ireland to prepare for the eventual integration with Europe that 
happened with the European Community (now European Union).38  Brian Girvin claims 
that Ireland did not improve because of American aid because Ireland’s isolationist 
tendencies prevented the nation from reaping the benefits of ERP.  Girvin argues that it 
was Ireland’s isolationism and economic ties to Britain that prevented the country from 
benefiting from Marshall Aid the way that other European countries did.39  Both Girvin 
and Whelan’s arguments reveal the tension among Irish leaders who desired to integrate 
with Europe and, yet, still grappled with their economic ties to the United Kingdom. 
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 But, despite the economic isolation from Europe and trade barriers, foreign 
affairs leaders in the Irish Department of External Affairs were advocates of increasing 
production and even industrialization.  Publicity campaigns, such as the film The 
Promise of Barty O’Brien, reveal the promotion of mass production, machinery, and the 
American ideals of consumerism.  The U.S. Government and European officials were 
extremely concerned with improving the economy, the rate of production and 
industrialization. The United States, through the ERP, attempted to revitalize the 
economy of Europe.  Most of Western Europe was already industrialized and ERP 
would revitalize industrialization and trade among European nations.  But, the goal of 
the ERP was not only to restore Europe to an industrialized, democratic continent, but 
the goal was also to create a model of consumerism like that of the U.S.  United States 
officials wanted to produce a nation of consumers, not only of European goods but of 
U.S. exports as well.  The Irish grappled with their love of U.S. media and their distrust 
of what many Irish people perceived as crass materialism and paganism.40 
Ireland is significant because it was, in many ways, a third world country in 
terms of industrial production.  Ireland was still very much an agricultural country.  
Farm machinery was sparse and the most important tiller on the farm at the time was 
not a machine, but a horse.  Since Ireland was devoid of industrial factories and, 
therefore, did not produce much beyond agriculture, Ireland did not have a consumer 
economy.  The creation of the Technical Assistance Program, which became important 
to Marshall Plan supporters in Ireland, highlighted the need for improvement in 
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development.  President Truman proposed his “Point Four” regarding the Technical 
Assistance program and how the U.S. would embark on a bold new program for using 
scientific knowledge and industrial progress to improve the growth of underdeveloped 
areas.  Peter Murray’s research on the Marshall Plan and technical assistance revealed 
the limitations of the program because of Irish conservatism and the actual suspension 
of aid in January 1952.41  Technical assistance would train Irish workers to be able to 
improve the efficiency, quality, and quantity of their work and this would lead to Irish 
industrial development.   
Northern Ireland contained the largest industrial area of Ireland, but the rest of 
Ireland lost its connection to industrialization after partition.  Industrialization was a 
primary concern among Irish officials during the implementation of ERP.  In a memo 
from the Department of External Affairs there was a discussion of a poster campaign 
not only to praise the ERP but also to show how Ireland’s “economic problem is 
increased by the partition of the industrial portion of the country from the rest.”42  
Scholars, such as Denis O’Hearn, argue that British and American power impeded 
Ireland’s attempts to industrialize.  O’Hearn even claims that, after partition, Ireland’s 
attempts at industrialization were hindered by U.S. companies that wanted to use 
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Ireland as a platform for accessing European markets.43  The rise of linen production in 
the north compounded economic problems for the south and west of Ireland after 
partition.  Irish industry was so heavily concentrated in the north and the agrarian 
economy became peripheral compared to the industrial northern sector of Ireland. 
Industrialization was a key talking point of Irish leaders during this time. Irish 
leaders like Seán MacBride believed the twentieth century’s new industrial power, the 
United States, challenged old industrial Europe when it began providing raw materials 
to Europe, causing Europe to import more than it was exporting.  The industrialization 
of the United States in the late and early twentieth century caused a “turn of the tide” by 
creating a dollar deficit in Europe, where the balance of trade was disrupted when 
Europeans were importing more than they were exporting.  The two world wars caused 
further chaos in the economy of Europe because there was a shortage of supplies and 
raw materials.  After the war, Ireland was in a difficult position compared to the rest of 
Western Europe because the economy relied heavily on agriculture and there was a 
dysfunctional interdependence between the British and Irish economy.44  The European 
Recovery Plan was the impetus for economic change because it would break down trade 
barriers and integrate Europe economically.  Ireland’s codependence with Britain’s 
economy hindered attempts at economic integration.  Because Ireland’s economy was 
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primarily based on agricultural production only, Irish officials, particularly in the 
Department of External Affairs, advocated an increase in industrialization in order to 
maximize land, labor, and capital in Ireland.  Both Irish and U.S. officials believed that 
an increase in agricultural production on a mass scale utilizing industrial equipment, 
electrification, and the Technical Assistance Program (which are all emphasized in The 
Promise of Barty O’Brien) would modernize Ireland.  A desire by many Irish officials 
to increase industrialization in Ireland reflects a paradigm shift in thinking at the time.  
The Marshall planners actively supported urban and rural workers because of this belief 
that high productivity, high wages, and a high consumption economy would lead to a 
better, more democratic way of life.45  However, not all members of Irish society were 
ready to embrace the values of capitalizing on land and increasing the production of 
goods that are so indicative of what makes a modern society, according to the U.S. 
standards of the time.46 
 This chapter reveals the complex history of the Marshall Plan and how a 
European and, specifically, Irish perspective is needed to fill in the gaps of the Marshall 
Plan players.  David Ellwood claimed that the Marshall Plan was “more than the sum of 
its parts”, and this thesis will support this claim by showing the struggle of individuals 
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in defining the identity of Ireland within the disparate aspects of ERP.47  Individuals in 
the Department of External Affairs like Seán MacBride and intellectual leaders like 
Sean O’Faolain embraced their national heritage but also viewed the ERP as an 
opportunity to integrate Europe and improve agricultural industrialization.  The plan 
was not just about economic recovery, but about selling a new vision to Europe.  That 
vision would involve an integrated Europe through “empire by invitation” with the 
guidance and leadership of the United States.   European countries such as Ireland, were 
attempting to define what their new vision would be and how that vision would fit into 
industrialization and integration.  In other words, would Ireland retain its conservative, 
nationalistic and economic co-dependence with Britain or would it accept U.S. monies 
and influence and work towards European integration?  
                                                 
47 David Ellwood, “‘You too can be like us:’  Selling the Marshall Plan,” 
History Today 48, no. 10 (1998): 33-40. 
 37 
CHAPTER THREE 
Sean O’Faolain and The Promise of Barty O’Brien:   
Irish Propaganda and Nationalism in an ERP Film 
 
Sometimes we would get visits from “big shots.”  That day there were 
two—one from the ESB (Electricity Supply Board). They run Ireland’s 
power.  And the other from ECA.  We didn’t know then what those 
mysterious letters meant.  You know, of course—Economic Cooperation 
Administration. It didn’t mean much to me then.  It did later.  ‘Twas the 
Marshall Plan.48 
 
 
The film The Promise of Barty O’Brien is unique because it was not simply a 
propaganda medium for the ERP, but it was also a full-length fictional drama written by 
a famous Irish writer and performed by the leading actors of the famous Abbey theatre 
in Dublin.  The film, although a propaganda piece for the American ERP, was created 
for the Irish by the Irish.  The film serves as a lens through which to view the struggle 
of many Irish people and officials between the traditional and the modern, isolationism 
and integration.  The film illustrates the rural, antiquated, agricultural production in the 
Irish countryside and advocates for an increase in productivity through newer industrial 
farm equipment, electrification, and technical training.  A young Irish farm boy, Barty 
O’Brian, participates in the Technical Assistance Program when he ventures to the 
United States to learn the special skills needed to improve production in Ireland.  The 
film is also significant because it was created during a time when the Irish were just 
beginning to understand the importance of film as a medium of expression, particularly 
through the use of film as propaganda rather than simply entertainment.  But the most 
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fascinating aspect of the film is the extent to which it demonstrates the complexities and 
contradictions of O’Faolain’s, and ultimately Ireland’s, vision of the new world order of 
ERP.  The Promise of Barty O’Brien is also an example of Irish leaders utilizing ERP 
publicity for promoting Irish nationalism and therefore exacerbating an already 
complicated relationship with the United Kingdom and the United States. 
Although the film The Promise of Barty O’Brien was not widely distributed or 
seen by the majority of Irish people, it opened in Dublin in 1951 to good reviews.  
Kevin O’Kelly of the Sunday Press wrote that the film 
demonstrates conclusively that good motion pictures can be made by 
Irish technicians….[It] is the first all-Irish propaganda movie worth 
serious consideration as a movie.  The Government-sponsored films 
made till now have merely been highly expensive lantern lectures.  They 
were a series of pretty pictures hooked up with a mechanized lecturer on 
the sound track.49 
 
The film was a full-length feature film running forty-nine minutes and featuring actors 
courtesy of the famed Abbey Theatre in Dublin:  Harry Brogan as Barty’s father; Eileen 
Crowe as Barty’s mother, Doreen Mannen as Barty’s sister; and Philip Flynn as Jim 
Byrne.  The actor Eric Doyle played Barty O’Brien.  The credits open with the names of 
the cast and crew against a backdrop of the map of Ireland and the United States with 
the Atlantic Ocean linking the two bodies.  In large letters, Sean O’Faolain’s name is 
shown as the screenwriter and in small letters:  “George Freedland was the director and 
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producer of the film”.50  The majority of the cast and crew on the film were Irish, 
making it an Irish film by the Irish and for the Irish people.   
The Promise of Barty O’Brien is significant not because of its success as a 
propaganda medium, but it is important because the film illustrates the conflicted 
feelings Irish leaders and many Irish people had about American foreign aid and 
industrialization.  O’Faolain is ambiguous in his treatment of the Irish characters and 
modernization in this film.  O’Faolain continues a long tradition of Irish nationalism 
and mysticism with his glorification of the peasant life of Barty and his family and, at 
the same time, he wrote a propaganda screenplay advocating for the benefits of 
modernization.  While he is a proponent of industrialization in the way he emphasizes 
the importance of the power plant, electrification, and education to produce skilled Irish 
workers, his portrayal of the backwardness of peasant life is evident in the thatched roof 
of the family farm and in the character of Barty’s father.  O’Faolain’s Irish roots in land 
and agrarian society are evident in the film.  He explained the problem of promoting the 
peasant life in an earlier work, The Irish:  A Character Study, where he declares 
we are rooted in the land and in individualism.  We have always feared 
towns and organized society.  We have felt them as spear-heads of life-
ways which are complex, troublesome and challenging.  To-day we call 
those life-ways ‘foreign’ and in trying to impose a peasant life-way on 
the towns we try to exclude anything which the peasant (especially the 
Catholic peasant) does not understand.51 
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O’Faolain’s frustration with the peasants’ resistance to change and the complexities of 
modern life emerge in the character of Barty’s father.  Barty’s father wants his son to 
become a farmer, but he challenges his son to improve his electrical training when the 
radio shuts down.  Yet, when Barty concedes that he needs more training and confesses 
he wants to go to school in Dublin so that he can be an electrical engineer, Barty’s 
father cries out “and leave this to go to the hungry city!  We would have to pay for 
every bite that went into your belly!”52  There is a sense that the city is all consuming 
and harsh, while the countryside is nurturing, familial, and part of Barty’s legacy.   
O’Faolain has an ambivalent attitude towards urban areas.  Dublin is portrayed 
as urban and bustling with the energy of cars and business, but it is also conveyed as 
overwhelming and lonely.  There is a sense of community in the family at the 
farmhouse and even in the local pub that is not found in the big city of Dublin or in the 
United States.  O’Faolain portrays many of the stereotypes in peasant life and peasant 
living in his film.  The family lives in the traditional thatched roof and does not have 
electricity.  While this was true of many contemporary farms in Ireland, Barty’s farm 
was an exaggeration of peasant living.  Barty laments the bog where “nothing grows 
there but heather”53 and this statement is contrasted with the image of the power plant 
that took over the fields.  The image portrays the plant as looming, powerful, and 
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productive.  The turf is lifted by machines out of the train and loaded into bunkers.  
Barty follows the journey of the turf to the furnaces where the turf is burned,  
generating heat, turning the water into high pressured steam, steam that 
is used over and over again thanks to the big cooling tower next to the 
plant.  It is the steam which turns the blades of the giant turbine up in the 
generator room where turf becomes electric power.54 
 
The plant fascinates Barty, but it also fascinates the viewer with its power, noise, 
productivity and its physical presence and dominance contrasted with the small, 
thatched-roof farmhouse.  This contrast between antiquated and modern, Irish and 
international, reveal the ambivalence of O’Faolain’s vision for a new Ireland.  
But this new vision for Ireland was overshadowed by the inherent images and 
references to Irish nationalism in the film.  The issue of nationalism pervaded every 
aspect of Irish life, transecting religion, language, ethnicity and culture.  Scholars 
disagree about a specific definition of what constitutes a nation—is it a shared culture, 
language, ethnicity, religion or border?  Some scholars identify a nation as a form of 
morality, a shared historical consciousness, economic life, territory, language, shared 
cultural life, and ethnic and civic obligations.55  Ireland, although a newly formed 
republic at this time, had a long history of shared language, religion, and cultural ties.  
The importance of religion, Roman Catholicism, lies at the heart of Ireland’s national 
identity and its assertion of nationalism.  Brian Jenkins argues that despite England’s 
ability to reconcile people of the most diverse races to their rule, the Irish have yet to be 
                                                 
54 Ibid. 
 
55 John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith, eds., Nationalism (Oxford:  Oxford 
University Press, 1995). 
 42 
reconciled to the union with the United Kingdom.  It was religion more than any other 
factor that defined Irish nationalism and opposition to the Protestant English.56  
Although it was an English colony for centuries, these shared cultural ties and the 
oppression of the Irish by the English united the Irish.  The struggle for home rule and 
autonomy from the English defines the overt nationalism of the Irish in the twentieth 
century.  But the Irish political elites of the 1940s and 1950s were often at odds with 
nationalism because it was isolationist and, in many ways, prevented Ireland from 
attaining economic prosperity.57 
O’Faolain’s references to the Easter rebellion in the film play upon this political 
and cultural unity of the Irish in opposition to the English.  Barty, the narrator in the 
film, recounts his experiences to an American visitor in the Shannon airport.  O’Faolain 
is speaking through Barty’s narrative in highlighting the importance of nationalism.  
Easter Sunday is emphasized in two significant scenes both because of its importance as 
a religious holiday and for its significance to the nationalists because of the Easter 
rebellion in 1916.  The first scene occurs when Barty leaves church after Easter Mass 
with his horse and carriage and rides from the town back to the farm.  Barty describes 
the rural town: 
the church stood at one end of town.  Our farm was at the other.  I said 
town, well it wasn’t quite a town but rather a village with thatched roofs 
on almost every house.  The street was deserted on Easter Sunday—the 
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village shop and post office all in one was closed.  So was the pub, of 
course…. remember, it was Easter Sunday and that means a lot to us in 
Ireland.58 
 
The statement is ambiguous, and a foreigner could interpret the statement to mean the 
importance of the resurrection of Christ, but every Irishman (and woman), would 
immediately understand the significance of this statement in terms of Irish history and 
nationalism.  The second scene occurs when Barty’s father is transformed while 
listening to the electrical radio on Easter Sunday when he hears the Irish national 
anthem and the radio broadcasts the events of the Easter rebellion in 1916.  Barty’s 
father was a fighter in the rebellion and Barty looks at his father with love and pride as 
they recall the past.  O’Faolain plays upon Irish nationalism in this scene and in other 
scenes from the film.  Barty’s father is emotionally affected when he hears the radio 
recalling the Easter rebellion.  Barty looks at his father in a proud, loving, and reverent 
manner.  In the scene where Barty is narrating his story to the American visitor, Gaelic 
can be heard from the loudspeakers in Shannon international airport revealing Ireland’s 
attempts to get the Irish to learn the native language.  This attempt by the Irish to 
reclaim their ancestral language demonstrates the fervent nationalism during this time—
after the declaration of the Republic of Ireland.   
 Religious imagery and religious language are prevalent in the film, 
demonstrating the sense of shared cultural and religious nationalism of the Irish.  The 
religious language and imagery are there to demonstrate the miracle of modernization, 
but they also serve as an important cue to bind the Irish in its shared cultural identity.  
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But the religious symbology is intertwined with Irish nationalism and, therefore, 
undercuts the promotion of modernization and integration with the outside world.  
Several Irish officials, like Conor Cruise O’Brien, and some of the intellectual elite, like 
Sean O’Faolain, fought against the conflation of Irish nationalism and religion.59  But 
the film is nonetheless brimming with religious imagery that is directly tied to Irish 
nationalism.  The film is constructed as a flashback where Barty recounts his journey to 
the Technical Assistance Program where he ultimately reveals the “miracles” that 
happened to him.   The film begins with Barty O’Brien returning from his technical 
assistance training in the United States.  He encounters an American businessman at the 
Shannon airport and labels his opportunities “miracles.”  When he stares at the large 
portrait of Christ in his bedroom, he dreams of the plant adjacent to his family’s 
farmhouse.  Soon after this dream, he is offered an opportunity to take engineering 
classes in order to become a skilled laborer.  He considers this opportunity to be a 
miracle.  The final miracle occurs at the end of the film after a string of significant 
events.  The first event takes place when members of the Electricity Supply Board and 
the ECA visit Barty’s engineering school. The men openly discuss the technical 
assistance program and express regret about taking candidates only from Dublin. They 
talk about how they wish they had recruited someone from the countryside—someone 
who would take back to the country the idea of rural electrification—someone who 
would know all the problems of Ireland’s small farmers.  Barty volunteers and is taken 
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back to the American Embassy.  He is informed about the Technical Assistance 
Program and his role in the electrification of Ireland.  Barty is one of several who will 
be sent for training.  The men ask Barty to promise them that he will come back and 
work with them on electrification in Ireland.  Barty must also promise his father that he 
will return to his father’s farm to work.  Barty struggles to find a way to fulfill both of 
the promises, which he does by the end of the film when he discovers that his sister has 
married a neighbor and they have joined their farms creating an efficient and productive 
super farm, thus releasing his obligation to work the family farm for his father.  He is 
now able to work for the electricity board and bring electrification, industrialization, 
and modernization to the Irish people.  This is the final miracle.   
 The Promise of Barty O’Brien reveals the ambivalence of O’Faolain and his 
ilk’s perception of the ERP.  The film extols the virtues of technical assistance, 
electrification, and industrialization.  However, this concept of modernity is contrasted 
with the glorification of the peasant.  The references to the Easter Rebellion signify 
Ireland’s continued obsession with nationalism and reflects the difficulty of the Irish 
people and Irish officials in the Department of External Affairs to work with ERP 
officials and European officials without making the issue of nationalism, specifically 
partition, a condition in negotiating international affairs.   
The nationalism inherent in the film is prevalent in most Irish art, literature, and 
creative media—O’Faolain’s work is no exception.  The Promise of Barty O’Brien is 
one of many Irish mediums used for advancing Irish nationalism.  The most extensive 
study of Ireland and film is in the book Cinema and Ireland by Kevin Rockett, Luke 
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Gibbons, and John Hill.  The book traces the film industry in Ireland from the silent 
film era of early 20th century to the 1980s.  The book dismisses the negative judgments 
of film critics that “are arrived at not on the basis of traditional conceptions of ‘artistic 
quality’ and ‘cinematic merit’ but, rather, according to the considerations of political 
complexity and formal and cultural self-consciousness.”60  The authors of the book 
attempt to look at Irish film without the rose-colored glasses of nationalism and 
patriotism, which were indicative of Irish art throughout the 20th century.  The authors’ 
comment,  
However, it is not only the received views of cinematic quality which 
this  discussion puts into question.  For it also casts doubt upon the 
conventional distinction, perhaps particularly predominant in Ireland, 
between the merits of high art, on the one hand, and the shortcomings of 
popular culture, on the other.  Literature has always enjoyed a privileged 
place within Irish culture and, indeed, it may well have been the peculiar 
premium placed on the written word which was, in part responsible for 
the shortage of enthusiasm for establishing a native film industry.61 
 
The Irish, particularly the artists, viewed any medium which they considered 
popular culture to be antithetical to high culture—a long history of having “high art” 
representations of Irish culture through literature:  stories and poetry. This tradition of 
high art comes from the Irish Literary Revival of the 19th and 20th century.  The revival 
arose out of a need for the expression of an Irish identity and sense of culture in Ireland 
that was separate and distinct from English influences.  The literature focused on Irish 
culture, Celtic mythology and folklore, and on the national heroes in Ireland.  Irish 
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literary nationalists like William Butler Yeats revealed the antagonisms between 
Catholic and Protestant and demonstrated the conflicted politics of his time through 
poetry and writings.62  Although certain periods of Irish history, like the revolt in 1798 
and the Charles Stewart Parnell’s fight for land and home rule, reveal an “English face 
of Irish nationalism” because of the unity between Protestants and Catholics, English 
and Irish, for a nationalist cause, the rift between religion and national heritage was the 
driving force of most Irish nationalist movements.63  According to sociologist John 
Hutchinson, cultural nationalism has been a significant ideological force as a political 
option against the state by the intelligentsia.  He defines the stages of Irish cultural 
nationalism from the first revival of the mid-eighteenth century, the second revival of 
the 1820s, and the third revival of the late 1880s that led to the Easter rebellion of 1916 
and the war of independence.64  Irish cultural nationalism is often political and 
religious, but it also glorifies nature.  The presence of farms and small villages in 
Ireland distinguishes it from England.  Some historians have suggested that the 
“natural” may have survived longer in Ireland because of a lack of development.  
Despite forest clearances, bog reclamations, and consolidation of some villages, 
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southern portions of Ireland escaped deep human penetration.65  Irish nationalists tried 
to distinguish between the differences of the outside world, namely England, and the 
importance of Irish political, religious, and agrarian life.   
Because of the emphasis on extolling the values of Irish life by Irish artists and 
writers as a result of the Irish cultural revival of the nineteenth century, Irish film did 
not become important in the representation of the realities of Irish life until later in the 
20th century because of a lack of funding, lack of government support, and this view 
that it was tied to popular culture and therefore not worthy of artistic expression.  
Documentaries became particularly important in the 1930s and 1940s.  Several 
documentaries during this period revealed the realism of poverty, unemployment and 
lack of industrialism in Ireland.  One example is the documentary The Irish Question 
which was made in 1944.  The film is an example of harsh realism in that it depicts an 
extremely rural and agricultural country with children running barefoot to school, and 
yet, it is still defined by the romantic view of Ireland and the Irish people as different 
and distinct.  The film even claims to justify the reasons why Ireland remained neutral 
during World War II in that 
Ireland’s unhappy history under British rule was an important factor in 
Eire’s decision to remain neutral, a decision which the freedom-loving 
nations of the world found difficult to comprehend.  But those who 
would understand this proud and sensitive people today and in the future 
should look, not to logic, but to the poetry of the Irish.66 
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The narration furthers the stereotype that the Irish are not defined by logic, but by some 
mystical connection to poetry and art.  It also explains Ireland’s neutrality in terms of its 
long ties to Britain.  The film explains that Ireland became neutral because the country 
had already been at war from the time of Norman supplantation of the Irish in the 
Middle Ages.  Ireland had only recently thrown off the yoke of English oppression and 
could not afford to enter into the arena of international war in the 1940s.  While Irish 
neutrality is somewhat understandable during World War II, the notion that the Irish 
people were too proud and sensitive and, therefore, must retreat from the new world 
order was patronizing and unrealistic.  The complex interplay of postwar politics:  ERP, 
economic recovery, diplomacy, NATO, International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)—forced Irish leaders to confront the 
new world order of postwar politics.67  The Irish could not afford to retreat into their 
poetry and romanticized history and exist in this new world of political and economic 
integration. 
 One of several documentaries utilized as political propaganda, Our Country, 
was created under the guise of a civic film, which would take a realistic look at Ireland.  
The film was created in 1947, and was criticized by Éamon de Valera, head of the 
Fianna Fáil party who were being challenged by the newly created Clann na Poblachta 
party.  De Valera used the film as a target in order to undermine Clann na Poblachta 
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because they were challenging the Fianna Fáil party’s sixteen year run as head of the 
Irish government.  The film is significant as a piece of propaganda because  
the film was under the banner of the Irish Civic Films in a fortnight 
during December 1947.  Irish scenes were intercut by direct camera 
statements by three of the Clann’s principal members, Seán MacBride, 
Noel Hartnett and Noel Browne….Our country, it is declared at the 
film’s opening, is your country.  But the short, astringent film lists the 
failures of Fianna Fáil’s 16 years in office:  emigration continues (this 
‘slow bleeding death of the nation’) as queues at Dublin’s UK permit 
office are shown; an unused plough highlights the failure to increase 
agricultural production; a shoeless working-class boy is contrasted with 
images of imported luxury goods; a shop’s empty shelves and signs of 
‘No Eggs’, ‘No Bacon’, emphasize the shortages of even essential 
foodstuffs.68 
 
This depiction of a realistic view of Ireland was merely a propaganda piece for Clann na 
Poblachta even though the film did touch upon some of the key issues facing Ireland at 
the time:  unemployment, emigration, and poverty.  MacBride replaced De Valera in 
1948 precisely because he and Clann na Poblachta ran such a rich political campaign 
through publicity and propaganda.  MacBride was particularly interested in producing 
“objective, precise, authoritarian information for the foreign reader in order to create a 
climate of interest in, and sympathy for, Irish affairs—particularly his perception of the 
injustice of partition”.69  When MacBride became head of External Affairs in 1948, his 
knowledge and appreciation of publicity and propaganda became important in 
implementing propaganda at the urging of the ECA.   
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 Sean O’Faolain was an Irish nationalist and, at the same time, he questioned 
the zealous fervor and isolationist tendencies of his peers, but nevertheless, his writing 
was characterized by an ambivalent and complex attitude towards Irish nationalism.  
O’Faolain was an Irishman, a Catholic, and born in the city of Cork in 1900.  He had 
witnessed the turbulence of the rebellion in 1916 and the Irish civil war that followed in 
the 1920s.70  He represented the generation of writers after the Irish Renaissance.  
Unlike the literary romanticism and idealism of the Irish people during the literary 
resurgence of the 19th and 20th centuries, O’Faolain’s worked was characterized by a 
kind of ambivalence regarding the Irish ideal because 
in the early Renaissance, these ideas were expressed in heroic form, as in 
much of the work of AE and the early Yeats.  Gradually they were 
subjected to ironic scrutiny and even parody…yet, these ironical 
treatments were not indifferent dismissals of Irish idealism; in their 
questioning way they were spiritual extensions of that idealism.  In a 
1934 essay entitled ‘The Emancipation of Irish Writers,’ O’Faolain 
remarks:  ‘Irish literature, as I feel it, has always been seeking escapes 
from the shattering of its ideals.’  This statement touches upon inherited 
idealism, realization of its failures, and yet the young Irish writer’s desire 
to be saved from idealism itself.71 
 
O’Faolain’s rejection of Irish idealism transcended his writing.  He also ventured into 
politics and journalism when he became a sort of cultural spokesman as creator and 
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editor of the newspaper The Bell in the 1940s.  As editor of The Bell, he “provided a 
haven of encouragement for a generation of young Irish writers suffering from anti-
intellectualism at home and, because of Irish neutrality during the war, dire marketing 
consequences abroad.”72  O’Faolain understood the complexities of a postwar world 
regarding trade, integration with Europe, foreign policy, and the importance of defense. 
 The same year the The Promise of Barty O’Brien was released, O’Faolain 
became embroiled in a controversy regarding United States’ intentions concerning the 
Marshall Plan.  In January of 1951, an article was published in the Irish Times regarding 
the Technical Assistance Program.  This article prompted a response in the form of a 
letter to all major Irish newspapers from Louie Bennett, an Irish trade unionist.  In her 
letter, Bennett questioned the intentions of the ECA’s altruism in giving aid to Ireland.  
Bennett wrote her letter after a major transition in U.S. focus regarding the Marshall 
Plan.  After the invasion of South Korea by North Korea in 1950, the U.S. focused less 
on the economic recovery of Europe and more on the defense of non-communist 
nations.  The outbreak of the Korean War “had radically transformed transatlantic 
relations as western rearmament rather than recovery became the first priority of the 
Truman administration.”73  In her letter, Bennett claims that “war-preparations are now 
the all-absorbing and dominant interest of the ruling authorities in America….are we 
drifting into such entanglements, or is it the deliberate policy of our government to link 
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Ireland with the U.S.A. in external affairs?  We are made aware that we are outside the 
Atlantic Pact only because of partition.  But America can provide the back door to the 
Pact.”74  Ireland refused to participate in NATO as long as the United Kingdom retained 
Northern Ireland under their control.  Ireland used the issue of partition as a condition to 
join NATO, but the key players were not concerned whether a small state like Ireland 
joined or not.   
O’Faolain responded to Bennett and other “like minded left-wing intellectuals” 
in The Bell by using the letter as a “polemic against the automatic knee-jerk anti-
Americanism among Irish intellectuals.”75  O’Faolain created the term 
“Autoantiamericanism” or “Auto-anti” to illustrate this knee-jerk reaction against U.S. 
motives.  The debate between the auto-antis and O’Faolain made its way into the 
American consciousness when his writing was reprinted in an article in Time Magazine 
on May 14, 1951.  O’Faolain asks the question, 
What are the sources, motives or unconscious origins of Anti-
Americanism?  First I would put British influences…[like] The New 
Statesman.  [It is] the British Bible of every washed-up Liberal, soured 
Conservative, lapsed Catholic, half-baked grammar school intellectual, 
the new technical boys whose knowing twang you hear on every bus, 
every manic-depressive Orwellite, fissurated Koestlerite, prehistoric 
Fabian, antique Keir Hardyite, flaming anti-Roman Catholic, like…and 
every other unhappy misfit, pink and pacifist, whose sole prophylactic 
against despair….Marshall Aid to the end of 1950 has cost every crude, 
rude, grasping, vulgar, selfish racketeering American fifteen shillings 
($2.10) a week out of his back pocket.76 
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O’Faolain challenges the auto-antis by claiming that their anti-Americanism comes 
from their own prejudices and preoccupations.  Most importantly, O’Faolain challenges 
them by implying that their anti-Americanism is derived directly from the British.  The 
idea that the Irish would derive or copy anything from the British in 1951, just a few 
years after officially declaring Ireland as a republic, would seem absurd and insulting to 
the Irish.  However, O’Faolain was trying to make an important point by reminding the 
Irish of their own ties to the United States.  After all, the U.S. was a former British 
colony just like Ireland.   O’Faolain “attributed such ungratefulness on the part of the 
Irish public to their reliance on Britain as the primary source of international news.”77  
Bennett’s retaliatory mimic of O’Faolain’s statement above demonstrates the annoyance 
with any claims that the Irish are influenced by British anti-Americanism.  She asserts, 
“I am anti-British, anti-American, anti-Russian and pro-Irish.”78  Bennett is also 
representative of a theme in Irish culture of the 20th century of pursuing a non-aligned 
third way for Ireland between the huge powers of communism versus capitalism.  
Bennett saw the struggle between the U.S.S.R. and the United States as a struggle of 
evil superpower conflict.  She envisioned Ireland as a David in a sea of Goliaths 
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struggling to maintain its position as a country concerned with Christianity, humanity, 
and anti-materialism.79  
 Another critic of O’Faolain, the writer Hubert Butler, also represented the 
predominant left-wing intellectual view that O’Faolain was advocating a policy of 
cooperation with the United States, which would ultimately undermine peace.  Butler 
argued that intellectuals (like O’Faolain and Butler) should “preach universal love and 
the abolition of frontiers and other spiritual things, while it is the duty of the state to 
punish him and confine itself to the realist task of defense.”80  Butler believed 
O’Faolain was a traitor against his own kind—the writer intellectual—because 
O’Faolain had abandoned his lofty pursuits of peace and spirituality by venturing into 
politics and foreign affairs.   
O’Faolain became increasingly disillusioned by these attacks from the Irish left-
wing nationalists.  He had originally set up The Bell to provide a kind of dialogue on 
Irish culture and current affairs.  However, because of the debate between his critics and 
himself, he expressed an  
obvious annoyance with an almost automatic rejection by many Irish 
nationalists of any form of foreign involvement in Irish domestic affairs 
even if they are as well-intentioned and potentially beneficial as the 
American ERP grants.  By claiming the high moral ground, in his view 
many Irish observers displayed an extreme naivety about international 
affairs or the true nature of the Cold War.81 
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What is interesting about O’Faolain’s debate is that he was remarkably silent about 
what the Irish government specifically should do about the current domestic and 
international situation.   
 O’Faolain’s ambiguous feelings about the Irish can be found in a book he 
wrote in 1949, two years before the film The Promise of Barty O’Brien debuted.  The 
book The Irish: A Character Study, was written as a reaction to the Irish nationalist’s 
sense of himself or herself as distinct, special, and therefore different and apart from the 
rest of the world.  In the preface to the book, O’Faolain explains 
this book is not a history of political events, although some political 
events are described briefly in the course of the main narrative.  It is, in 
effect, a creative history of the growth of a racial mind; or one might call 
it a psychological history; or, if the term were not far too large and 
grandiose, the story of the development of a national Irish civilization; 
although what has happened in the Irish mind is not an undisturbed local 
expansion but a complex process of assimilation at the end of which 
Ireland enters, with her own distinctive qualifications, into the great 
general stream of European culture.82 
  
O’Faolain attempted to dispel the myth that the Irish are racially and culturally pure.  
He traced the roots of Irish culture, the mythology derived from the Irish kings, the 
influence and inculcation of the Celts, the Vikings, the Normans and the Anglo-Saxons 
in order to dispel the myth of cultural and racial purity in Ireland. O’Faolain claimed, 
“all our histories are nationalist, patriotic, political, sentimental.”83  O’Faolain expressed 
ambivalence about this Irish experience of their past—he both praised certain aspects of 
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Irish history but also condemned the idealization of Irish nationalism.  He described the 
rebel tradition of Ireland in the late eighteenth and nineteenth century:  Wolfe Tone, 
Daniel O’Connell, the Young Irelanders, Fenianism, and Charles Stewart Parnell.  
O’Faolain claimed “that all these men deprived Ireland of as much as they gave to it:  
They choked the critical side of their minds, they were good rebels in proportion as they 
were bad revolutionaries, so that their passion for change and their vision of change 
never pierced to organic change.”84  O’Faolain took a great risk in challenging the 
iconic figures of the rebels in Irish history.  He also attacked other facets of Irish culture 
and history, including Irish literature, which he claimed had two main problems—
provincialism and nationalism.  O’Faolain explained 
the dangers need no underlining.  Herbert Read speaks of the writer’s 
roots being sunk deeper in the soil where the outlook is confined, and 
Irish literature amply illustrates what he means; but Irish literature also 
illustrates what he means by the confined outlook, for this word “soil” 
will readily suggest to us how soon a yawning boredom may follow the 
constant repetition of over-familiar peasant motifs.  One need go no 
further than the Abbey Theatre to see how easily this repetition exhausts 
the soil, and our interest.85 
 
He cautioned writers against clinging to provincialism and the idealism of 
nationalism.  He claimed that  
man is a thinking animal, and writers are supposed to think more 
intensely than other men, and when they have depicted all the usual local 
rural themes—land-hunger, match-making, sexual-repression, the 
farcical side of village-life, political jobbery, nationalist fervours and 
nationalist disillusions and so on—they naturally want to turn, with the 
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turn of their thoughts, to those other issues which the world’s wider stage 
brings to their notice.86 
 
O’Faolain was acutely aware of the problems that provincialism and nationalism 
posed for the Irish people.  However, at the same time, he was part of this 
tradition of cultural nationalism and it is apparent in his screenplay of Barty. 
 The issue of nationalism revealed the contradictions in Irish society and 
identity during this period.  Modernization Theorists in the 1950s argued that 
nationalism and the formation of nation-states implied inevitable processes of 
assimilation.  In many ways, Ireland was a newly formed nation-state in the twentieth 
century, but it was still very much economically and culturally tied to the United 
Kingdom.  Miroslav Hroch emphasized the role of regional elites and the uneven 
economic development within states, arguing that local elites whose interests were 
threatened by larger markets and global forces often encouraged the spread of 
nationalist sentiment to protect those interests.87  Hroch argued that nationalist 
movements developed in three stages: 
First, nationalist movements assume an apolitical, folkloric character; 
second, they are taken up by literate elites wishing to inculcate the 
“national idea” and organize the masses; and third, nationalist 
movements then truly gain mass-based support.88 
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The development of Ireland in the nineteenth and twentieth century seems to follow this 
model.  However, many, including the cultural elite like O’Faolain, had a different, 
more progressive, less nationalistic vision of Ireland.  The romanticization of 
agricultural, peasant life contradicted the goals of O’Faolain and forward-thinking 
members of the Department of Foreign Affairs.  While state formation and politics form 
a major impetus for nationalism, so do national consciousness, identity, and symbols.89  
This period of nationalism and the ERP reveal the struggle and contradictions inherent 
in the film The Promise of Barty O’Brien, which both extols Irish life and also 
advocates the modernization and industrialization promoted by the Americans.     
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Working Together?  Ireland’s Ambivalent Relationship with the  
United Kingdom and the United States 
 
 
The issue of Irish nationalism in The Promise of Barty O’Brien and other media 
reveals the complex history of Ireland in relation to the United Kingdom.  In many ways 
the relationship between Ireland and the United States was also complicated because of 
the historical connection between the Irish people and Irish Americans, but Irish 
neutrality during the war and the “special relationship” between the United Kingdom 
and the United States reinforced tension in Ireland’s official relationship with the U.S.90 
Ireland’s complex economic and historically colonial relationship with the United 
Kingdom became an issue concerning Ireland’s search for integration and 
modernization with regard to ERP.  The Irish increasingly identified with being 
European (rather than only Irish) and, therefore, considered their nation culturally 
superior to the crass commercialism of the United States, thus compounding the 
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complicated relationship between the countries.  The perception of U.S. dominance also 
created tension between European nations and the U.S.  Because the U.S. was a 
superpower during this period, the simple nature of its ascendancy created a sense that 
the country was trying to dominate the world even if this was not the intention of U.S. 
officials.91  
Despite the shared connection between the United States and Ireland, in many 
ways their relationship became strained in the 1940s and 50s.  Ireland’s neutrality 
during the war became an obstacle to what type of aid, if any, Ireland would receive 
from Marshall Aid funds.  The concept of neutrality has always been a major 
component of modern, Republican Irish thought.  Irish neutrality became an aspiration 
of many key Irish officials and it arose out of the spirit of the Locarno Treaties in 1925.  
Éamon de Valera believed strongly in neutrality and, despite antagonism toward the 
British, he also believed that Ireland should not be used as a base to attack the United 
Kingdom.92  This policy of neutrality, which became official during the event of World 
War II when both Britain and the United States went to war, led Ireland to become a 
pariah state after the war.  Since Ireland’s economic interests were linked to Britain and 
the two economies were interdependent, with Ireland disproportionately reliant on 
British markets and imports, Irish neutrality was not economically justifiable, despite 
                                                 
91 Alfred Grosser, The Western Alliance:  European-American Relations since 
1945, trans. Michael Shaw (New York:  Vintage Books, 1982). 
 
92 Raymond J. Raymond, “Irish Neutrality:  Ideology or Pragmatism?,” 
International Affairs (Royal Institute for International Affairs 1944-) 60, no. 1 (Winter 
1983-1984): 31-40. 
 
 62 
being morally justifiable for many. United States officials during the Truman and 
Eisenhower administrations held a certain amount of contempt for Ireland since it did 
not participate in the war.93 
 The strained relationship between the United States and Ireland regarding 
neutrality is visible in the correspondence between U.S. ECA officials and Irish leaders.  
Carrigan, the Chief of the ECA Mission to Ireland and an Irish descendent, attempted to 
smooth over the tension between U.S. and Irish officials when an article appeared in the 
Irish Independent stating that Ireland was included in ERP because she was an 
economic boon to Britain despite her neutrality during the war.94  Con Cremin, 
Assistant Secretary of External Affairs, submitted the minutes of a meeting after the 
paper came out to Carrigan voicing his concern that Ireland would be treated unjustly 
and unfairly because of its neutrality.  The minutes state,  
It is difficult to see why Mr. Lawrence should single out Ireland for 
remarks of the kind attributed to him as compared with, e.g. Sweden, 
which is also receiving a loan at the present time.  The peculiarity of 
these remarks is enhanced when one remembers that the Bizone is 
receiving ECA Aid.  Finally, to choose the moment of signature of a 
Loan Agreement to imply that a special exception was being made in 
favour of Ireland, although neutral in the war, seems particularly mal á 
propos and is not calculated to lessen the risk of misrepresentation and 
resentment among the general public.95 
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Irish officials were wary about the ways in which the United States would implement 
the ERP funds.  The correspondence between U.S. officials and Irish officials 
underscores the minefield of diplomacy and negotiation involved in order to get Ireland 
on board with ERP.   
 The Irish perception of American intentions was also complicated.  Many 
Europeans, including the Irish, liked to distinguish themselves from Americans, who 
they viewed as materialistic and uncultured.  Many perceived the Americans’ attitude 
towards Europe as condescending.  They resented the idea that the United States was 
elite, more progressive than Europe, and generally superior.  The idea of “American 
Exceptionalism”, the belief that the U.S. was not only unique but also superior, guided 
U.S. policymaking in the twentieth century.  There are different types of 
exceptionalism, but the more dominant strand is that of the missionary nation, as 
represented by the ideas of manifest destiny, imperialism, leader of the free world, and 
the new world order. Europeans, including the Irish, resented the United States because 
of U.S. perceptions of superiority over Europe.  The U.S. not only exported foreign aid, 
but also American culture.  American exceptionalism is one of the most important 
concepts underlying modern theories of American cultural identity.96  This belief in the 
messianic role of American policy and culture alienated and angered Europeans.  W.B. 
Stanford of Dublin lambasted the Americans’ verdict that ERP productivity was too 
slow in relation to European unity at the third session of the Consultative Assembly of 
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the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.  Stanford emphasized the cultural and spiritual 
differences between Europeans and the United States.  He asked if 
the Americans would like all the European Gothic cathedrals to be 
streamlined into functional skyscrapers.  Would they like Shakespeare 
and Dante to be reduced to official condensations in some “Reader’s 
Digest?”  Cultural and religious matters, he said, were as dynamic in 
European affairs as economics and sociology.97 
 
The tension between officials such as Stanford and the U.S. ECA representatives is 
indicative of the complicated relationships between the nations.  The Irish Workers’ 
League threw a leaflet at the American Ambassador to Ireland as he passed through the 
streets of Dublin, that read “the American imperialists and their British stooges are 
doing everything to involve all countries in their devilish aims”.98  An article in the Irish 
Independent revealed the cultural differences between the U.S. and Europe:  “the 
American representatives do not seem to understand what it means to be a European.  
They do not seem to understand what we live for, and, sometimes, die for.”99 Men like 
Carrigan had to navigate the minefield of U.S. and Irish relations during the 
implementation of the ERP.  Although Carrigan was well-liked by Irish officials 
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because of his good nature and his Irish heritage, many Irish leaders, like Stanford, 
distrusted U.S. intentions and the materialistic culture of America.   
While Irish leaders were suspicious of U.S. intentions with regard to ERP, 
everyday Irish workers were also concerned about the implementation of the ERP.  In 
1950, the Irish Workers’ League threw leaflets at the American Ambassador as he was 
walking through the streets of Dublin. At least one young man was arrested in the 
incident.  The leaflet was a call to action against U.S. imperialism.  Interestingly, the 
pamphlet makes a distinction between U.S. officials and the American people.  At the 
beginning of the leaflet, it states “greetings to the great American people—but not to the 
men of Wall Street.”100  The pamphlet urges the Irish to fight the American imperialists 
and the British stooges and claims “we want peace, improved living conditions and a 
genuine fight to end Partition without conditions.”101  While many Irish, including the 
Irish Workers’ League, were wary of American and British intentions, Ireland was 
nonetheless dependent on both nations to support its economy. 
Although Ireland tended to distance itself politically and culturally from the 
British, it was still economically tied to Britain, but this posed problems for Irish 
officials who, now that Ireland was officially politically independent of the British, 
wanted economic independence as well.  Yet British involvement in the Marshall Plan 
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became a major factor in Ireland’s decision to economically integrate with Europe since 
the Irish economy was so dependent on the British economy. The ECA Loan Director, 
Mr. Lawrence, stated in Washington that despite her wartime neutrality, “Eire was 
included in the ERP because she was ‘almost an agricultural adjunct’ of Britain.”102  
Ireland’s economic ties and agricultural exports to Britain were precisely why the ECA 
provided Marshall Plan funding to Ireland in the first place.  
Contrary to most people’s perception of the Marshall Plan, the impetus for the 
plan was not solely economic, but also institutional and political in nature.  The goals of 
the Marshall planners were much more ambitious than economic recovery.  They 
wanted to create a postwar world that would not fall victim either to the extremism of 
the inter war years or the scourge of communism.103  Britain’s decision to participate in 
the Marshall Plan had profound consequences for Ireland.  The policy of the Marshall 
Plan proved to be a pivotal moment in Britain’s postwar relations not only with the 
United States, but also with Europe and, in particular, Ireland.  
However, the British attitude towards integration was ambivalent at best.  
Because of the “special relationship” between Britain and the United States, Britain 
anticipated that they would benefit even more from the Marshall Plan than their 
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European contemporaries and were sorely disappointed when the Marshall planners 
treated them no differently than France, for example.  British Foreign Secretary Ernest 
Bevin informed Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs William Clayton that 
“he had strong reservations about America’s new policy of providing aid to Western 
Europe as a regional bloc, arguing that this would effectively mean that Britain would 
be treated as ‘just another European country’”.104  In fact, Britain’s Economic Policy 
Committee (EPC) created an ambiguous policy called the “doctrine of limited liability” 
also known as the “recognition of the point of no return.”105  This policy of “limited 
liability” was Britain’s way of reassuring itself that it would not become involved in the 
economic affairs of continental Europe beyond the point of no return.  However, no one 
could pinpoint when or where exactly the point of no return could occur.  The doctrine 
of limited liability did become an issue in Britain’s involvement in the OEEC. The 
OEEC was created in 1948 for the purpose of administering the Marshall Plan in 
Europe.  The purpose of the organization was to restructure a war torn Europe, but it 
also helped integrate European economic policies.  The OEEC provided the foundation 
for economic integration and, to some extent, political integration when Americans 
Averill Harriman and Paul Hoffman decided to appoint a director general and conduct 
ministerial meetings.  Harriman served as U.S. Coordinator of the European Recovery 
Program, one among many political positions where he had great influence, and Paul 
Hoffman served as the first administrator of the ECA. 
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The British strongly objected to this notion of economic integration, much less 
political integration in any form.  Interestingly, American efforts to create a political 
organization in the OEEC failed, but the experience of the OEEC laid the foundation for 
future institutions of integration such as the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) and the EEC.106  The problem of economic and political integration was evident 
throughout the latter twentieth century.  Even during the establishment of the European 
Union, nationalism emerged despite the globalization of the European economy.  
National identities proved to be an obstacle to European integration even at the end of 
the twentieth century.107  
Britain’s continual refusal to be integrated with continental Europe came to a 
head with regard to the 1950 Schuman Plan, an integrationist plan developed by France 
that would exclude the British.  The French, recognizing that Britain was a reluctant 
participant in European integration, developed an integrationist plan without the 
country.  The Schuman Plan was created to facilitate an incremental liberalization of 
trade and market integration by combining the French economic and military security.  
Therefore, the first step towards supra-nationalism in Europe arose from a French need 
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to secure its military and economic interests in German and French coal and steel 
production.108   
Britain’s refusal to participate in the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) was a crucial turning point in Britain’s postwar history.  This was the first time 
that Britain declared publicly that it was against a federal Europe.  Many historians 
claim that British officials could not have made a greater attempt to commit to 
integration in the OEEC and the ECSC because they were obviously no longer the 
powerful global empire of the prewar era.  However, it was not unthinkable that 
Britain’s empire had vanished in 1947 when the nation still held worldwide interests 
across the globe.109  Although it was probable that Britain could regain its world power 
status after the war, the doctrine of limited liability should have been reevaluated—
especially by the time of the Shuman Plan.  Even though Britain was a reluctant 
participant in European integration, its participation was significant because the country 
agreed to work not only with the United States but also with continental Europe. 
The Marshall Plan was important because disparate European nations were able 
to work together and because it was a joint endeavor between Europe and the United 
States.  Europe was able to garner much needed economic aid and stability after the 
war.  The United States benefited from the plan because it guaranteed that communism 
via the Soviet Union would not creep in the ERP countries’ quarters.  However, 
American leaders underestimated the power of a united Europe.  While not all, several 
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U.S. officials believed Europe was comprised of backward, conquered people who 
desperately needed assistance and guidance to survive in the brave new world of the 
U.S. and Soviet superpowers.110  This U.S. perception of Europeans further complicated 
Britain and Ireland’s relationship with the Americans.  But the issue of partition and the 
legacy of colonialism exacerbated an already strained relationship between British and 
Irish officials. 
What distinguished the Marshall Plan from earlier American aid programs was 
that the planners decided to get rid of the idea of case-by-case aid.  Instead, they 
adopted the idea of a coherent west European strategic concept.  Even though, by 1947, 
the United States had spent over $9 billion in a variety of aid programs on the European 
continent, European industrial and agricultural production was still much less than that 
of the prewar era.111  The strategy of this coherent economic aid was deeply rooted in 
the foundations of the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.   
The idea of a coherent west European strategy included the European nations working 
together toward some type of integration.  Because Ireland’s economy was bound to 
Britain, the reluctance of the United Kingdom in accepting integration proved another 
obstacle to Irish leaders, particularly in the Department of External Affairs, who wanted 
to pursue integration with Europe.  But the idea of a united Europe was an evolving 
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concept and the terms of European integration and European unity were widely 
interpreted and loosely applied.112  United States officials believed that the Marshall 
Plan would act as insurance, essentially preventing communism from enveloping 
Europe.  American officials believed that some type of integration of Europe was 
needed to secure an undivided Europe and protect the western European countries 
against the encroachment of communism.  However, the interpretation of the word 
integration varied greatly.113  Europeans were excited about the economic advantages of 
integration if it meant the removing of trade barriers, removing tariffs, and allowing the 
free flow of goods among the devastated countries of Europe. 
Ireland’s role in the Marshall Plan reveals its complicated and often strained 
relationship with Britain.  In 1948 the British head of the Finance Division of the 
Treasury, Otto Clark, claimed “it is more important to us that Eire should receive 
adequate aid than it is for Eire herself.”114  In his statement, Clark reveals the need for 
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Ireland’s economy to flourish—particularly agricultural production and exportation of 
agriculture to Britain—since the economies of both countries were so co-dependent.  In 
February of 1948, a coalition government led by John A. Costello replaced the Fianna 
Fáil government led by Éamon de Valera.  Seán MacBride, part of this new coalition 
and leader of the radical republican Clan na Poblachta party, became the new minister 
for the Department of External Affairs.  MacBride immediately set out to distance 
Ireland from Britain and tackle the issue of partition, which became linked to the 
politics of Ireland’s role in the ERP.  Because of Ireland’s historical dependency on 
trade with Britain, Irish leaders looked to Marshall Aid as an option to close the dollar 
deficit after the suspension of the dollar-sterling convertibility in August of 1947.115  
The ECA had decided only to offer loans to countries that it assessed could repay the 
loan without difficulty.  Irish leaders wanted to bypass this requirement by convincing 
the ECA that Ireland could not repay any loans once it could no longer draw from the 
sterling area dollar pool.  But ECA officials rejected this argument since currency 
convertibility could not be achieved as earlier planned.  Indeed, the total sum of 
Marshall Aid to Ireland was $148 million and only $18 million of that money was 
issued in grants. 116  The historian Raymond J. Raymond argued that Ireland received 
more loans than grants than any other ERP country because of its neutrality during the 
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war.117  Ireland was in a difficult position regarding the ERP loans: the government was 
confronted with the complication of its economic links to Britain and the Irish-
American Lobby in the U.S., who were attempting to make partition the central issue in 
Irish affairs with regard to Britain and the U.S.  To make matters worse, the Americans 
enlisted British assistance by asking them to threaten to block Ireland’s access to the 
sterling area dollar pool if it continued to finance its dollar deficit by running down its 
sterling balances and, in turn, the British took advantage of the dispute between Irish 
and ECA officials by supporting Irish officials’ cause to get grants instead of loans.118  
If Britain could have united with Ireland in its cause to receive grants by implying that 
Ireland was not in a position to pay back the loans, this might have furthered British 
foreign economic policy with regard to the sterling area. 
 But, what finally distanced Ireland and Britain with regard to the Marshall Plan 
was the conflict over the increasing economic integration of Europe when the 
Americans attempted to raise the status of the OEEC by increasing the power of the 
executive powers in the Council of Ministers by appointing a strong director general, 
the Belgian Prime Minister Paul-Henri Spaak.119  MacBride became extremely 
supportive of Spaak and the increasing power of the OEEC in integrating Europe, much 
to the dismay of the British and French officials who believed Spaak was a firebrand 
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and unqualified for such a high position in the OEEC and, therefore, were not in favor 
of his appointment.   
Interestingly, when MacBride initially took office, there was no indication that 
he would become such a staunch supporter of European unity.  One of the reasons 
MacBride supported integration was he saw an opportunity to garner American support 
to use against the British.  MacBride was attempting to make Ireland a greater player in 
the international arena by his many policy proposals in the OEEC such as increasing 
Irish exports like agriculture and wool, but he also wanted to use this opportunity to 
gain American support of anti-partition.  It is ironic that this proposal came from a 
country so concerned with self-sufficiency and so dependent on a single export 
market.120  But, this is also indicative of Ireland’s struggle for identity in a postwar 
world—desiring a stake in the international economy, and, at the same time, struggling 
to protect her own national economy in the face of partition and debt from ECA loans.  
When Ireland did not join the North Atlantic alliance because of the issue of partition, it 
cost Ireland the remaining $1 million of technical assistance and $18 million of 
potential grants as Marshall Aid turned into military assistance because of the outbreak 
of the Korean War in June 1950.  Ireland became less and less strategic in American 
foreign policy. 
The complex relationship with Britain and the United States illustrates Ireland’s 
struggle with how, and to what extent, the country would economically and politically 
integrate with Europe.  This tension is prevalent in the Department of External Affairs’ 
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rise to a position of power in the postwar world.  The ambivalence regarding 
relinquishing the old nationalistic, conservative means of living can also be found in the 
tension between the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Finance.  
The complex relationships between nations, and within the nation of Ireland, 
demonstrate the problems of integration in the years after the war.  These complex 
relationships and the problems of working together were compounded by Irish officials 
desire to inject nationalism in their promotion of the ERP in order to highlight the 
problems of partition.  Like O’Faolain’s struggle between nationalism and European 
integration in his writings and, specifically, in The Promise of Barty O’Brien, Irish 
officials also could not divorce themselves from Irish nationalism, which was ever 
present in Irish thinking and in international diplomacy. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
The Rise of the Department of External Affairs:   
Pushing for European Integration and Irish Nationalism 
 
 
The traditionally accepted historical analysis of Ireland’s involvement in the 
Marshall Plan is that Ireland was a reluctant participant in the ERP.  Many officials in 
government were wary of U.S. intentions regarding Marshall Aid and Irish leaders were 
concerned about U.S. hegemony in the postwar era.  They were also wary about 
economic and political integration with Europe.  Despite the tendency of many Irish 
leaders to fear outside aid and influence, a group of Irish officials in the Department of 
External Affairs were actually proponents of foreign aid and even European integration.  
The Department of External Affairs became a major participant during postwar 
diplomacy and participation in the OEEC.  The Department of External Affairs rose 
from a small department to a major player in the game of distributing ERP aid.  
However, the Department’s push for integration and cooperation with the United States 
was ultimately limited by Irish conservatism and nationalism.  Like Barty’s struggle 
between traditional, national values and the desire to train in the technical assistance 
program in the United States, Irish officials in the Department of External Affairs were 
excited about the unique opportunity of ERP, but also like Barty, Irish nationalism and, 
specifically, partition consistently emerges in Irish thought and policy. 
The Department of External Affairs was essentially the foreign affairs and 
diplomatic office for Ireland.  External Affairs was created in 1919 as the Department 
of Foreign Affairs to advance Ireland’s political interests.  In 1922, the department was 
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renamed the Department of External Affairs and it would retain that name until 1971, 
when the department reclaimed its original name of Department of Foreign Affairs.  
Initially, the Department was primarily concerned with political interests, but after the 
implementation of the ERP and the opportunities of ECA funding and European 
economic integration, leaders in the department increasingly had to grapple with both 
political and economic issues.  The opportunities afforded by the European Recovery 
Plan and the change in leadership of the Department of External Affairs from a more 
conservative group of individuals to a more progressive group of charismatic foreign 
affairs officers increased the importance and role of the department during this time. 
The Department of External Affairs’ desire to accept foreign aid from the ECA 
conflicted with the more conservative tendencies of the Department of Finance.121  
While the Department of External Affairs managed diplomacy and foreign affairs, the 
Department of Finance in Ireland administered the public finances of the country and 
the collection and expenditures of the revenue of Ireland.  The Department of Finance 
initially rejected the loans offered by the ERP and, instead, asked for grants.  
Department of Finance officials mistrusted the idea that Marshall aid would save 
Ireland from economic destruction and, therefore, they believed that if Irish officials 
were going to accept any aid at all, it would be in the form of grants and not loans.  The 
conservatism of the Department of Finance was directly contrasted with the 
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personalities in the Department of External Affairs.  The “acerbic” governor of the 
Central Bank, Joseph Brennan, and Secretary of the Department of Finance James 
McElligott argued against accepting any aid except if the money was given in grants.  
They argued that Ireland did not have the dollars to pay back the ECA.  McElligott 
retorted the Irish “cannot expect any measure of salvation from the Marshall Plan.”122  
The tension between the two departments reveals the desire for External Affairs to take 
advantage of ERP opportunities versus the conservative realism of Finance to secure 
Ireland’s market in a tenuous economy.   
The departments displayed vastly different attitudes, but it was the important 
role that individuals played in the acceptance and implementation of the Marshall Plan 
that made the Department of External Affairs unique among Irish government agencies 
at the time.  The role of the European Recovery Plan in Ireland was important because it 
allowed the Department of External Affairs to essentially come to the fore in the Irish 
administrative system once Éamon de Valera was replaced by Seán MacBride as 
minister and F.H. Boland was appointed secretary.  Although, in the short term, Irish 
leaders in departments like Finance and conservative Irish leaders resisted European 
integration, the increasing importance of the role of External Affairs in its duties to the 
ECA allowed it to provide a foundation for eventual integration in the EEC.123  The 
need for diplomats and foreign affairs agents to administer and cooperate with the ECA 
elevated the importance of the Department of External Affairs and caused the 
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department to expand during this period.  External Affairs would also play an important 
role in Ireland’s history because it was comprised of some brilliant and dynamic 
individuals.  
 The Department of External Affairs increased both in size and importance 
from 1945 to the 1950s.  Although Ireland experienced six years of neutrality during 
World War II, the Marshall Plan provided a way to force External Affairs’ operations 
into foreign economic policy when it was invited to join in the planning and 
implementation of ERP resources. Although the focus of the leaders of External Affairs 
was not only on integration at this point, this expansion and the changes in leadership in 
the department created the beginning of a more international outlook among Irish 
diplomats and foreign affairs leaders.124  This European (though not necessarily 
integrationist) outlook began to emerge in the Department of External Affairs following 
World War II.125  Michael Kennedy describes a “brainstorming” conference held by 
External Affairs on Tuesday, September 11, in 1945, which was an unprecedented event 
in External Affairs’ short history and marked the beginning of the department’s postwar 
expansion.  Minister of External Affairs Éamon de Valera led a conference that brought 
together at secretary level the key actors who would oversee Ireland’s slow engagement 
                                                 
124 Till Geiger, “The Enthusiastic Response of a Reluctant Supporter:  Ireland 
and the Committee for European Co-operation in Summer 1947,” in Irish Foreign 
Policy, 1919-1966:  From Independence to Internationalism, eds. Michael Kennedy and 
Joseph Morrison Skelly (Dublin, 2000), 222-246. 
 
125 Michael Kennedy, “The Challenge of Multilateralism:  The Marshall Plan 
and the Expansion of the Irish Diplomatic Service,” in Ireland, Europe and the 
Marshall Plan, eds. Till Geiger and Michael Kennedy (Dublin:  Four Courts Press, 
2004), 102. 
 
 80 
with Europe during the late 1940s and 1950s.126  Part of the discussion was the 
significant role that diplomats could play in highlighting the importance of Ireland and 
its struggles.  J.P. Walshe, Secretary of External Affairs at the time, referred to Irish 
diplomats as “Apostles for this country” who should look for every opportunity, 
whether by talks or lectures or personal contacts, to do the work for which they have 
been sent abroad.127  Although Walshe would remain secretary for a short time because 
of his health (he was replaced by F.H. Boland in 1946), his words reveal the desire for 
Irish External Affairs to increase the level of diplomatic activity abroad.128  However, it 
is clear that after the war, External Affairs was not entirely sure about the place it would 
occupy in the new world order.129 
 Two important changes in the Department of External Affairs affected 
Ireland’s involvement in the Marshall Plan and built upon the desire of the 1945 
conference attendees to include a place for Ireland in the post World War II new world 
order.  The first change was the appointment of F.H. Boland to Secretary of the 
Department of External Affairs in 1946.  Walshe and Boland had extremely different 
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personalities and experience in international affairs.130  Boland’s experience in 
international affairs placed him in a unique position where he could utilize his 
diplomatic experience to earn respect for Ireland in the international community.  
Boland was considered an outstanding diplomat during his stint in External Affairs.  It 
was his experience in the department’s League of Nations section from 1934 to 1936 
and his experience from 1936 to 1938 as head of the foreign trade section of the 
Department of Industry and Commerce that allowed him the knowledge and expertise to 
be able to establish a place for Ireland in the new economic and international order in 
Europe.  These experiences allowed him to understand diplomacy and international 
commerce, which would have a profound affect on Irish foreign policy.  Boland also 
created a more complex interface between senior and middle management in the 
department, expanded Ireland’s overseas missions, appointed (for the first time) a 
diplomat at the rank of ambassador (Walshe as diplomat to the Vatican in 1946), 
strengthened the Irish high commissioner’s office in London, and strengthened the Irish 
Consulate in New York in preparations for Ireland’s eventual inclusion in the United 
Nations.131  When Ireland failed to gain admission to the United Nations in August of 
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1946 following a Soviet veto, the department began to reorient their foreign policy 
away from an Anglo-American Atlanticist focus and began to look towards Europe.132   
The biggest challenge for Boland and the Department of External Affairs came 
in 1947, when Boland led the department at Paris during the multilateral negotiations 
that would prepare a joint plan for the economic reconstruction of the European 
continent.  The Paris conference would be Ireland’s first involvement in postwar 
multilateral diplomacy and it would be one of the key events of the Marshall Plan.  It 
also marked a turning point in Irish diplomacy.  Boland and his increasingly 
technocratic department faced their first major challenge in the Marshall Plan—
multilateral European diplomacy.133   
External Affairs not only played an important role in the diplomatic arena, but 
also had to increasingly confront issues dealing with economic matters.  In 1948, a 
Department of External Affairs’ memo revealed the urgent need to organize and expand 
the department’s role.  The memo states “any inefficiency, delay or lack of attention in 
dealing with ERP may have very serious results on our national economy.”134  The 
Department of Finance did not value the emerging international systems of integration 
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and economic ties because they were wary of displacing Anglo-Irish financial trade 
with the sterling area with a new, possibly tenuous international economic system.  
However, the Department of External Affairs was cautiously looking towards Europe 
and utilized the negotiations within the Committee for European Economic Cooperation 
(CEEC) and Marshall Plan aid as a way to determine and change Ireland’s economic 
relations with Europe, the United States, and, effectively, the United Kingdom.  
External Affairs’ involvement in the CEEC allowed the department to take over many 
of the areas that the Department of Finance had previously controlled, thus affecting the 
future and direction of Irish economic policy.135   
 The second major change in the Department of External Affairs was the 
appointment of Seán MacBride as minister of the department.  The change in 
government in 1948 replaced de Valera with John A. Costello.  Costello appointed 
MacBride as minister.  MacBride was a highly regarded lawyer, onetime chief of staff 
of the IRA, and a “politician with some daring, though unorthodox, views on the 
development of Ireland’s international position.”136  MacBride was influenced by the 
troubled relationship between Ireland and the U.K.  His father was executed after his 
involvement in the Easter uprising of 1916.  MacBride fought in the Anglo-Irish War, 
the guerrilla war against the British fought between 1919 and 1921.  MacBride was 
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imprisoned for IRA activities on numerous occasions.  MacBride founded the 
republican and socialist party Clann na Poblachta in the hopes that it would replace 
Fianna Fail as the majority party in Ireland.  He was instrumental in his involvement in 
the Republic of Ireland Act, which led to the official Declaration of the Republic of 
Ireland in 1949.  This act of independence solidified Ireland’s breaking away from the 
United Kingdom and the British Commonwealth. 
Despite the fact that MacBride was politically charged, his fervor regarding the 
engagement of Ireland in European affairs was in tune with the rest of the Department 
of External Affairs.  MacBride established a separate ERP Section in External Affairs in 
1948 and, under MacBride, the department as a whole increased and expanded from 
five to seven divisions.137  The Information Division, headed by the famous Irish 
government figure Conor Cruise O’Brien, was set up to influence international public 
opinion about the issue of partition.138  The division would also work with the ERP and 
the Cultural Relations Divisions to publicize Ireland and her foreign policy abroad.  The 
Information Division also implemented and carried out campaigns to publicize and 
praise the ERP (in accordance with a bilateral treaty with the United States).139  ECA 
worked with the information division and officers in each country to provide funding 
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for the creation and distribution of ERP propaganda through press releases, posters, 
photographs, newsreels, radio, film, and other media.  MacBride utilized these media, 
which were intended to promote ERP, in order to highlight the issue of the partition of 
Northern Ireland.  MacBride had experience in the creation of propaganda during his 
political campaigns, and he used this knowledge to manipulate ERP propaganda to draw 
attention to the partition of Ireland, which he believed was a political, cultural and 
economic blow to the Republic of Ireland.   
 In addition to his passionate nationalism, Seán MacBride was also a dynamic 
leader in the Department of External Affairs.  He worked well with ECA officials in 
leading the way for Ireland’s involvement in ERP.  In a speech for the ECA Head of 
Mission to Ireland Joseph Carrigan, MacBride admits the obstinate and conservative 
nature of the Irish and, yet, reveals a pleasant working relationship with U.S. officials 
like Carrigan.  MacBride reveals that the Irish 
are a conservative people who are not in particular anxious to move with 
the times and that hate to be told what to do or how to do it.  I, therefore, 
had visions of squalls perturbing the placid life of our relations with the 
United States of America.  Far from such fears being realized I found, on 
the contrary, that within a short space of time I had given to Joe Carrigan 
full permission and encouragement to address as many public meetings 
and gatherings as possible.140 
 
However, MacBride was also a nationalist at heart and the issue of partition became the 
centerpiece in his attempt to promote ERP.  In an interview to the National News 
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Service in 1950, MacBride begins the interview with Cold War rhetoric related to the 
“struggle between democratic rule, on the one hand, and political dictatorship on the 
other hand.”141  The rhetoric shifts to the discussion of democracy and the abuse of 
democracy because of Britain’s partition of Northern Ireland.  MacBride claims that 
the partition of Ireland and the occupation of a portion of Ireland by 
British forces against the will of the overwhelming majority of the Irish 
people is a flagrant violation of the basis upon which democratic rule and 
freedom depend.  If it is permissible for Britain to claim jurisdiction over 
and to occupy a portion of our country, and therein to set up and support 
an administration against the will of the overwhelming majority of the 
Irish people, why does it become a heinous offence when Russia or 
Germany does likewise in Europe.142 
 
While MacBride did have some success in the European sphere, his continual 
attempt to make the issue of partition and the ending of partition a condition for Irish 
membership of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) became an annoyance 
to U.S. and European officials.  This unfortunately backfired on him and the department 
because he overestimated Ireland’s importance to the Americans and the British.  Irish 
membership in NATO was not a major factor in the United States and Britain’s 
perception of international security.143  This exclusion of Ireland in NATO underscored 
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the still relative unimportance of Ireland with regard to the “big players” of the United 
States and Britain.  The Treaty of Brussels in 1948, a precursor to NATO, was 
established by the United Kingdom, France and the Benelux countries in order to 
provide a united defense against the encroachment of communism.  These countries 
eventually included the United States because they needed its military prowess for 
defense.  Since the establishment of NATO was both a European and, in particular, a 
British initiative, and therefore, the exclusion of Ireland revealed not only the peripheral 
importance of Ireland to the U.S. and Britain, but also the tense relationship between 
Britain and Ireland.  Ireland’s fear was not limited to wariness of U.S. empire building, 
but they were also skeptical of British intentions. 
 The Irish government and the Department of External Affairs had to figure out 
a way to work with U.S. and yet, sustain independence.  Some conservative leaders, like 
de Valera wanted political and economic isolation for Ireland—this policy contrasted 
with ERP goals of integration and intercontinental trade and tariff relief.  Irish leaders 
also had to discern how to publicize the problem of partition without alienating the 
United States and Great Britain.  The issue of Irish nationalism emerges in ERP 
propaganda such as the film The Promise of Barty O’Brien, discussed in chapter two, 
but leaders like MacBride also injected issue of partition in other propaganda media, 
which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
Propaganda and Politics:  Partition, Nationalism and ERP 
Many ECA officials, including Hoffman, believed the United States had an 
important responsibility in distributing propaganda explaining its position as the leader 
of the free world.  However, ECA officials were uncomfortable with the word 
propaganda.  Propaganda often had (and has) a negative connotation.  The U.S. 
Congress was particularly reluctant to use the word propaganda since it was such an 
effective tool of coercion used by both Mussolini and Hitler in establishing totalitarian, 
fascist regimes before the outbreak of World War II.  This hesitance to use propaganda 
changed when a group of United States senators visited Europe in late 1947.  They were 
dismayed and overwhelmed by the power of Soviet propaganda, which was seen as yet 
another threat in the Cold War.144  U.S. officials recognized that they had to utilize their 
own propaganda to stymie the flood of Soviet ideology in the free world.  However, in 
lieu of using the word “propaganda,” U.S. officials used the word “information” instead 
as a comfortable term for the distribution of information regarding the Marshall Plan.  
But the overarching purpose of ERP propaganda was to assuage European fears of 
economic instability by demonstrating that Europe could recover from the economic 
devastation of the last war by embracing democracy, capitalism, free trade, and 
consumerism.  According to an early ERP publicity campaign, which ran the slogan 
“you too can be like us,” Europe’s economy would recover if it adopted U.S. ideals of 
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democracy and free trade.  This European adaptation of a U.S. model would counteract 
any leanings towards the Soviet model.  At least, this was the goal of ECA officials. 
    The bilateral Economic Cooperation Agreement authorized the use of 
propaganda with the full support of each participating country’s signatures.  Funds for 
publicity and propaganda came “from the five percent cut which the ECA extracted 
from each country’s counterpart fund along with the ECA’s own budget for the 
purpose.”145  ECA worked with the information division and officers in each country to 
create and distribute propaganda through press releases, posters, photographs, 
newsreels, radio, film, and other media.  European recovery propaganda was given 
priority in France, Italy, and the German Bizone because of the raw economic and 
unstable conditions after the war.  Ireland was in the third tier of priority for 
propaganda.  The CIA did not consider the problem of communism in Ireland a serious 
threat because they believed that Irish Catholicism would prevent infiltration by anti-
religious communists.146  Even though the U.S. government did not perceive Irish 
citizens as a threat to democracy and capitalism, nonetheless the State Department in 
the U.S. was concerned that the United States needed to be credited with Marshall aid 
as a means to demonstrate the power and preference for the right side—democracy, 
freedom, and capitalism.  Secretary of External Affairs Boland agreed that the ERP 
countries should be reminded from time to time that the United States is furnishing their 
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aid.147 
 Until 1948, the State Department was in charge of the ERP and, subsequently 
also in charge of publicity for the program.  When ECA personnel finally arrived in 
Dublin in 1948, they immediately began to tightly control publicity for ERP and ensure 
that Irish officials were executing the information in a timely and efficient manner.  
Since there was no official Information Division within the ECA mission in Dublin 
because of the low threat of communism compared to countries like Italy, William H. 
Taft was assigned the position of information officer until Clement R. Hoopes took over 
in 1950.  There was a tremendous amount of pressure placed on the Irish officials and 
the ECA officials for Europeans to meet and fulfill their ERP obligations, particularly 
with regard to publicity.  The ECA needed to reassure the U.S. Congress that the aid 
they voted for with regard to ERP funds was indeed being used in an efficient and 
effective way.  Congress and other U.S. officials also needed reassurance that the fight 
for democracy, the perception of a strong, benevolent America was winning in the war 
against communism.148 
 When Seán MacBride replaced Éamon de Valera as minister for External 
Affairs in 1948, there was a major shift in the publicity campaign for the ERP because 
MacBride wanted to promote the ERP and enthusiastically advocated promotion 
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through propaganda media. Internal documents from the Department of Foreign Affairs 
in Ireland in 1948 and 1949 reveal a push to publicize the ERP to the public.  A letter 
from the ECA information officer, Taft, indicated that the publicity of the ERP was 
insufficient and the members of the External Affairs would “be expected to publicize 
the programme in other ways.”149  ECA officials were worried that “as far as the public 
was concerned, ECA has now lost its novelty and the natural tendency from now on (as 
happens with all administrations) will be to carp and criticize.”150  Assistant Secretary 
of External Affairs Con Cremin feared that ECA officials believed Ireland was not 
doing enough to publicize the ERP to its people, so he and MacBride launched a new, 
more “sophisticated, specialised, and targeted ERP information campaign.”151   
   MacBride, Cremin, and others began to focus on using new media to publicize 
the ERP.  In the memo regarding OEEC propaganda from the Department of External 
Affairs in 1949, Irish officials discussed the reasons for implementing publicity.  They 
not only wanted to highlight the ERP to the Irish, but they were also interested in using 
the publicity campaigns to further Ireland’s own agenda in competing with the British 
and focusing on the issue of partition. Britain’s production of “Getting on Together,” a 
publicity pamphlet, which extolled the virtues of Marshall Plan Aid created a sense of 
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urgency among External Affairs’ officials to create their own successful propaganda 
campaign.  The pamphlet was widely praised by the ECA officials.  The memo 
describes how 
Britain has issued a considerable amount of publicity and was very proud 
of the production of “Getting on Together.”  The proposal (of Sir 
Stafford Cripps) to hold this exhibition was intended to enable Britain to 
“show off” to other countries.  This renders it all the more important that 
publicity work should be undertaken without any delay.152 
The urgency for Irish officials to create a competitive piece of propaganda increased 
when the Council of Ministers in Paris held an exhibition of ERP publicity materials.  
The Council urged all ERP country members to participate in the exhibition.  Not to be 
outdone by the British, the Department of External Affairs wanted to create a greater 
piece than the critically acclaimed British work of “Getting on Together.”  But more 
than anything, they also wanted to take advantage of the publicity campaign by 
highlighting the issue of partition.  In the same memo, there is a discussion of a poster 
campaign not only to praise the ERP but also to show how Ireland’s “economic problem 
is increased by the partition of the industrial portion of the country from the rest.”153  
MacBride consistently emphasized the problem of partition in ERP propaganda and 
directly to the media.  In an interview with the International News Service in 1950, 
MacBride stated that 
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in many respects the problems affecting Ireland’s economy are very 
different from those affecting the economy of other nations, which have 
participated in the Recovery Programme.  We only gained control of our 
own affairs, after our War of Independence, in 1921.  Until then, for 
reasons which are obvious, the development of our economy has been 
stunted.154 
 
Although the poster campaign would be used to compete with the productions of other 
countries as a sort of advertisement of “Irish imagination and art,”155 the campaign 
would also show how the partition of Northern Ireland hindered Ireland’s ability to 
invigorate its economy and, subsequently, the European economy.  MacBride was 
concerned that Ireland would be overshadowed by Britain and in a memo in 1950 he 
argues that the Irish officials “feel that we are entitled, despite Britain’s strength, 
diplomacy and propaganda, to the friendly help and support of the democratic 
nations.”156 
         The Department of the Taoiseach, the head of the Irish government led by John 
Costello during this period, was also concerned with how the Department of External 
Affairs would handle publicity.  In 1949, there was a memorandum on the creation of 
an official news agency that would present general information about Ireland to the 
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world (and vice versa) and give special attention to the issue of partition.  The 
memorandum expressed concern that “direct propaganda would not be published by 
newspapers, but carefully selected news items will be published.”157  The government 
linked the problems with the economy directly to partition.  Northern Ireland contained 
the industrial section of the nation and the issue of partition heightened not only the 
nationalist urge to retain all of the counties in Ireland in the Republic, but also the 
impetus of the economists to retain the money-making industrial sector.   
 Irish and ECA officials utilized new media to publicize the ERP, including 
radio.  In 1949, a series of talks concerning the ERP occurred on Radio Eirann, the 
public service broadcaster of Ireland.  The talks were lead by Seán MacBride, Minister 
for External Affairs, J.E. Carrigan, Chief of the ECA Mission to Ireland and W.H. Taft, 
III, assistant to Carrigan and information officer.  The talks were actually published that 
year and placed into circulation with a forward by John A. Costello, Taoiseach of 
Ireland.  Costello, in his forward, discussed the importance of ERP aid despite the fact 
that Ireland was small and seemingly insignificant in relation to other European 
countries.  He says 
While there may be definite limits to the part Ireland can play in 
influencing the international economy the improvement of our own 
economic system is a matter largely within our power.  The future 
prosperity of Ireland, however, is dependent to a considerable extent on 
the success of attempts now being made to restore the international 
economy.  Because of our small size as a nation we may not be a 
determining influence in the success of these attempts, but through our 
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participation in the plan for European Economic Co-operation, we are 
enabled to play a not inconsiderable role in assisting them.158 
Radio broadcasts allowed Costello, MacBride, and the ECA officials to convince the 
Irish that ERP aid was necessary and vital to not only the prosperity of the Irish 
economy, but also to the European—even world—community at large since all 
economies were intertwined.  Costello placed extra emphasis on the plight of the Irish 
farmer when he discussed the problems of chronic under-investment and under-
employment in Ireland.  Costello said that these conditions are 
the result of under-investment in the past, may have been partly caused 
by the fact that the Irish farmer, unaided by State assistance, has been 
incapable of providing himself with the capital necessary to improve 
substantially the productivity of his land.  It is a great campaign for the 
elimination of these conditions of under-employment that the Irish 
Government needs the aid which the bold and generous policy of the 
American Republic has lent us.159 
Costello advocated for the Irish farmer because farming was the single greatest 
economic sector of Ireland at the time.  The talks emphasized the dire situation of 
Ireland’s economic conditions.  While Carrigan and Taft discussed the importance of 
ERP aid in relation to Ireland’s economic growth, Taft chose to emphasize how tourism 
and efficient industries using high-quality raw materials and craftsmanship would bring 
in dollars, and Carrigan emphasized how better research and education in agriculture 
could increase production and, therefore, economic growth in Ireland.  MacBride began 
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the talks by discussing Europe’s economic problems because of the lack of a balance of 
trade.   
    In these talks, MacBride discusses the industrialization of Europe since 1850.   
He mentions the turning of the tide in industrialization between Europe and the United 
States.   As a colony of the British, the United States provided raw materials to the 
industrial world and, later, became an industrial power itself.  The industrialization of 
the United States caused this “turn of the tide” by causing a dollar deficit in Europe due 
to an imbalance of trade.  Europeans were importing more than they were exporting and 
this created the imbalance.  The two world wars caused further chaos in the economy of 
Europe because there was a shortage of supplies and raw materials in Europe.  
MacBride states that some countries, including Ireland 
overworked their soil and thereby reduced their productive capacity.  
The absence of fertilisers, and feeding stuffs, over a period of years, may 
take much longer to mend, in terms of livestock and crops, than a direct 
hit on a factory by a bomb.160 
MacBride stressed the importance of farming because it was such a vital aspect of the 
Irish economy.  The exhausted soil and antiquated farming techniques placed Ireland at 
a disadvantage as an exporting company.  The talks were broadcast to the public, but 
MacBride and the other Irish officials were keenly aware that they were also appealing 
to ECA officials in their publicity campaigns.  If they could convince the ECA to invest 
in the farming industry, it would revitalize Ireland’s economy. 
 In his second talk, MacBride discussed the problems of the interdependence of 
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the Irish and British economies.  Because Ireland belonged to the sterling area, most of 
its financial dealings with the outside world occurred through London.  This did not 
present a problem until 1947 when the reserves of the sterling area began running out, 
and it ceased to be convertible.  Because of the depreciation of the purchasing power of 
the pound sterling, Ireland was unable to import materials such as fertilizers, feeding 
stuffs, and machinery.  This had a serious effect on its productive capacity in farming 
and, therefore, the export of foodstuffs to Europe and abroad.  MacBride credits the 
ECA and the ERP program for providing loans to the Irish government for the purchase 
of these import items, which, in effect, would allow Ireland to become an exporting 
nation again.161 
 In his last talk before the American ECA officials’ turn, MacBride placed 
particular emphasis on the importance of land, labor, and capital in Ireland.  MacBride 
explained that, as a nation, Ireland’s first task must be the utilization “to the full of the 
natural resources that God, by His providence, has placed at our disposal.”162  The goal, 
MacBride said, is that every acre, every parcel of land in Ireland will be productive.  
The Minister of Agriculture, Dillon was directly responsible for the operation of land 
productivity in Ireland.  Dillon is quoted by MacBride as stating that “our ultimate 
objective is to secure the rehabilitation of every acre of arable land in Ireland so as to 
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ensure that the men who work upon it will get a fair return for the work they do….”163 
Although MacBride placed particular emphasis on the importance of land and the 
cultivation of land, he ended his portion of the talks by explaining that he did not want 
to deemphasize the importance of industrial development.  He went on to explain that 
the success of an industry depends on the availability of raw materials.  MacBride 
explained how Ireland needed to increase timber production, which would lead to 
building numerous other industries for the creation of artificial silk, rayon, cellulose, 
paper, cardboard, etc.  MacBride also explained that there was a need for an increase in 
the production of electrical power.  He says that while waterpower is being explored,  
plans have been adopted, and are being carried out, for the erection of 
turf-burning generating stations in some of the bog areas.  In that way, it 
will be possible to convert our turf into electric current and to bring heat 
and power thus generated to the points where it is required.  This is by 
far the most efficient and economic way of utilising our turn.  I have 
sought to give you an outline of the way in which Ireland can rehabilitate 
herself economically and help Europe at the same time.164 
The turf, or peat, historically has been an important resource in Ireland.  When the peat 
is cultivated from the bogs and dried out, it makes an excellent source of fuel.  Even 
though peat was used in Ireland at the time for fuel, MacBride advocated its cultivation 
on an industrial scale and, in particular, as a source of industrial power.  This move 
towards electrification and mass production of peat is evident in the film The Promise of 
Barty O’Brien, where Barty is evidently fascinated by the looming power plant and the 
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efficiency of the machinery.  Barty’s ultimate goal is to leave the farmhouse and retain a 
job in electricity so that he can play a role in the electrification of Ireland, which will 
ultimately lead to the industrialization of Ireland and improve the country’s economy by 
allowing the production of materials, not just agriculture, for European intercontinental 
trade.  This push towards mass production was in accordance with the plans of the ECA 
officials and the participating European countries.  The ERP countries’ goal was to 
mass-produce needed materials for the other European countries.  Unlike the Soviet 
Union, industrialization would exist in conjunction with free trade among ERP nations.  
Ireland’s economy would benefit from the production of materials, but the European 
economy would also improve.  At least, that was the goal of the European Recovery 
Plan. 
    When Clement R. Hoopes took over as information officer in 1950, he took 
advantage of a wider range of communication media to publicize the ERP.  In Ireland, 
this new media would focus on the importance of the farming community since this was 
the strongest economic sector in Ireland at the time.  The importance of farming and the 
increase in agriculture production with the use of new and more efficient machinery is 
evident in media like The Promise of Barty O’Brien, where Barty’s father’s farm is 
joined with another farm and the horse is replaced with a tractor.  During this period, 
the horse was the most prevalent “machine” on the farms of Ireland so in the push to 
increase agricultural production, Irish leaders and ECA officials also demanded the 
implementation of modern, efficient farming machinery to counteract the slow, 
antiquated farming involving the horse and plow. 
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 Many ECA officials believed the farming community had been neglected in 
publicity and information, despite the Radio Éireann talks and other public 
documents.165  Carrigan used the radio again in 1950 to emphasize the importance of 
research and education in agriculture in a program titled “What Marshall Aid is Doing 
for the Irish Farmer.”166  Also in 1950, a concerted effort was made to target Irish 
women and children through radio programs and art exhibitions.  The publicity 
campaign also targeted the Irish public through concert and musical performances. 
 The year 1950 also marked the outbreak of the Korean War, which caused a 
change in the focus of ECA publicity.  U.S. policy began to place the importance of 
military needs over European economic reconstruction.  However, U.S. policy and, in 
particular, ECA publicity, still focused on the vulnerability of “free Europe.”  In 1950, 
the ECA Information Division in Paris recognized the changed circumstances due to the 
war and communist threat to the free world.  It produced an outline acknowledging the 
change in focus of ECA: 
(1) Marshall Aid and military assistance are good for you because they 
give you—as Europeans—a fighting chance to make Europe strong 
enough to discourage any aggression. 
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(2) But—this strength can only be achieved through unity.  As separate, 
rival powers, the nations of Free Europe are weak, are dangerously 
exposed. 
(3) Productivity must increase because more food, more machines, more 
of nearly everything is needed to make Europe so strong it will be 
unassailable.167 
The ECA publicity campaign continued to place a strong emphasis on productivity.  
ECA officials relied on the Anglo-American Council on Productivity, the ERP 
Technical Assistance Program and the ERP Productivity Program to increase European 
production levels.  The idea was that an economically strong Europe would fend off the 
falling dominos of Communism.  Free trade, foodstuffs, electrical power, and increase 
in imports and exports would create a strong economy in Europe.  In other words, 
Europe would become like the United States—industrial, free traders, capitalistic, and 
free. 
 In this latter stage of the ERP after 1950, film became the chosen media for the 
dissemination of publicity and propaganda.  Albert Hemsing recounts his experience in 
the Film Unit in the Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television.  Hemsing 
dismisses the controversy over using propaganda to promote the ERP when he claims 
that  
It is almost pointless to quibble about what propaganda is. In today's 
media-saturated environment ECA-MSA's information activities would 
count as an exercise in public diplomacy, a term now regularly used by 
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the US Information Agency to explain its mission, and even by the 
Department of State.168 
According to Hemsing, the propaganda films were merely tools of diplomacy and 
served to highlight the different needs of the participating countries as well as the 
generosity of U.S. support.  Hemsing describes the films as having different purposes 
and serving different countries.  However, despite the variety of the types of films, he 
divides them into seven categories:  “straight forward reports on one or more ‘one 
country’ aid projects intended for the citizens of that nation…films reporting to all the 
ECA nations…European unity, free trade and international cooperation…anti-
communist Cold War  propaganda…productivity and technical assistance 
themes…mutual security, i.e. strengthening NATO’s defenses…and films for American 
television.”169  The fifth category of productivity and technical assistance applies to 
films like The Promise of Barty O’Brien.  
 In his memoir, Hemsing recalls the generous funding and process of making a 
film through the ECA.  Hemsing worked in the Information Division at the ECA’s 
headquarters in Europe from 1948 to 1955.  The Information Division in Paris was 
located across from the American Embassy by a park near the Avenue des Champs 
Elysses.  A film could be proposed in a couple of different ways.  The mission chiefs 
from each country receiving Marshall Aid could propose a film to support a local need 
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or a major project.  The Information Division chiefs would also propose films that 
might be suited for general ECA nations.  In fact, the Film Unit in Paris proposed many 
of the films since the department was comprised of European filmmakers who had 
experience and expertise in making films.170  Lothar Wolff, the first chief of the Film 
Unit, described the working philosophy of the unit in 1951:  
All of them [the films] were prepared for Europeans by Europeans. 
European producers—numbering some of the world’s outstanding 
documentary specialists—were allowed by their American supervisors in 
ECA’s motion picture section to tell the Marshall Plan story in the style 
most appreciated by their fellow Europeans…if their pace seems 
somewhat slower than Americans are accustomed to, and if the 
propaganda content seems perhaps too subtle, it should be remembered 
that these techniques are considered most effective for transatlantic 
audiences.”171 
Wolff stressed that the films are not merely American propaganda films created for the 
purposes of furthering American needs, but they are truly for Europeans by Europeans 
as a way of promoting projects, aid, and defense.  He implied that the European 
audience was more culturally nuanced and sensitive than an American audience.  This 
demonstrates a European view that the Europeans are more cultured than the United 
States.  This cultural clash between the U.S. and Europe is evident in several areas of 
the implementation of the ERP. 
 The Marshall Plan films were distributed in several different ways.  Since 
television barely existed in Europe, non-theatrical (16mm) film became the best vehicle 
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for showing the films.  The United States Information Service (USIS), a division of the 
State Department, kept a film library at each American Embassy to allow for easy 
access and distribution of the films to local ECA countries.  Theatrical distribution was 
also a popular way to distribute and screen the films since it could target larger groups 
of people who could view the films at their local movie house.172  When the Marshall 
Plan formally ended in 1952, the Mutual Security Agency (MSA) inherited the 
Information Division and further utilized the propaganda machine for NATO and other 
military purposes.173  Film became a valuable medium through which to publicize 
American aid and contributions from the U.S. to ensure European security.   
      The propaganda films issued by the ECA demonstrate the Marshall Plan’s foray 
into new media for the publicizing of American aid.  However, The Promise of Barty 
O’Brien, like other publicity campaigns by the ECA in Europe, further demonstrates 
how these films were made for Europeans by Europeans.  In the case of Barty, the film 
was in many ways an Irish film made by the Irish for the Irish.  The film The Promise of 
Barty O’Brien and other media in Ireland were used to highlight and promote ERP.  The 
media show how Ireland was attempting to work with the United States to promote U.S. 
aid and, at the same time, use the medium of propaganda to highlight the political 
agenda of partition and play upon Irish nationalism.  Although the film was not 
                                                 
172 Ibid. 
 
173 Ibid., 270.  Hemsing describes how the Korean War had increased the sense 
of threat from the Soviet Union. 
 
 105 
distributed to a wide audience, it strategically targeted Irish officials and U.S. ECA 
officials. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
Conclusion:  How Nationalism and Anti-partition  
Prevented Ireland From Fully Benefiting From ERP 
 
The story of Irish involvement in the Marshall Plan has never been fully 
explained mainly because it transects the economic, social, political and 
diplomatic history in the period 1947-1957….174 
 
Ireland was neutral and partitioned when the Marshall Plan began, and 
it remained so when the plan ended.175 
 
Despite the efforts of the filmmakers of The Promise of Barty O’Brien and Irish 
proponents of integration and modernization, such as O’Faolain and MacBride, Ireland 
failed to reap the benefits of ERP aid and fully integrate with Europe after World War 
II. A lack of industrialization, failing to break economic ties to the United Kingdom, 
and making partition a condition of membership in NATO revealed the limitations of 
Irish leaders’ attempts to enter the international political and economic arena.  The 
isolationist tendencies of many Irish officials reflected the conservative nature of the 
Irish who preferred to isolate Ireland from the rest of Europe by relying on Ireland’s 
conservative, agricultural, and nationalistic heritage.  Irish leaders grappled with their 
isolationist tendencies and nationalistic fervor, which often took precedence over 
economic and cultural integration with the European continent. The European Recovery 
Program provided an opportunity for Irish leaders to participate in world affairs, but the 
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issue of partition continually alienated the superpowers.  Although Irish leaders were 
enthusiastic about participating in integration and welcoming cultural and economic 
resources, Ireland ultimately failed to meet the expectations of modernization and 
integration inherent in both the film the Promise of Barty O’Brien and the ERP’s goals.   
While the ERP essentially ended Ireland’s self-imposed isolation because of 
their neutrality during the war, Irish leaders were still resistant to European integration.  
Ireland’s economic ties to Britain isolated Ireland from economic integration with 
Europe.  The issue of partition prevented Ireland’s inclusion in NATO and frustrated 
ECA officials’ attempts to implement ERP.  Although Ireland did experience a 
Europeanization of Irish policy in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the impediment of 
political and economic nationalism prevented international cooperation in these early 
years after the war. Ireland would eventually pursue integration with Europe in the form 
of the European Community and is currently a member of the European Union. 
The problem of nationalism and the partition of Northern Ireland prevented the kind of 
electrification and industrialization envisioned in The Promise of Barty O’Brien.  
Northern Ireland contained the largest industrial area of Ireland, but that connection to 
industrialization was lost after partition. The Department of External Affairs and 
individuals like F.H. Boland and Seán MacBride were pivotal in working with the ERP 
towards a new vision of Ireland and European cooperation, but the Department of 
Finance and nationalistic organizations like the Irish Workers’ League compromised 
their efforts.  In addition, Irish leaders continued to make partition a political issue when 
discussing and promoting ERP.  Even though MacBride increased and expanded the 
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Department of External Affairs from five to seven divisions and created the Information 
Division to influence international public opinion about Ireland and the ERP, his 
continual attempt to make the issue of partition a condition for Irish membership in 
NATO led to Ireland’s loss of important economic aid that would have increased 
electrification, agriculture production, and industrialization.   
ERP officials wanted to increase manufacturing, wage labor, income levels, and 
occupational diversification. Irish leaders in the Department of External Affairs 
emphasized the importance of industrialization because the Irish economy relied heavily 
on agriculture, but the dysfunctional codependence of the British and Irish economy and 
the conservative economic and political nationalism of Irish leaders prevented economic 
integration with the continent and forced the continuance of economic, and conversely 
political, isolation from the rest of the world.  The issue of partition prevented Ireland’s 
entrance into NATO.  This not only cost Ireland the remaining money for technical 
assistance and potential grants, it also demonstrated a failed opportunity to work within 
the international arena and show that a small, seemingly peripheral nation could 
participate in international decisions and even defense.   
 Irish leaders and the Department of External Affairs took advantage of the 
ERP publicity campaign in order to highlight the issue of partition.  ERP officials 
pressured the Information Division to utilize funds specifically to publicize the 
importance of ERP and American generosity, but MacBride and other Irish officials 
actively used these resources to highlight the problem of partition and use the forum of 
newspapers, radio and film to argue against partition.  Rather than pleasing the ERP 
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officials, this proved to be another annoyance to U.S. leaders who had invested a great 
deal of money in the ERP propaganda campaign.  In radio broadcasts, Irish officials 
linked the problems of the economy directly to partition.  Northern Ireland contained 
the industrial section of the nation and the issue of partition heightened not only the 
nationalist urge to retain all of the counties in Ireland in the Republic, but also the 
impetus of the economists to retain the money-making industrial sector.  Irish leaders 
tried to work with the United States to promote U.S. aid and, at the same time, use the 
medium of propaganda to highlight the political agenda of partition and play upon Irish 
nationalism.    
 Although Irish leaders and individuals alienated U.S. officials because of the 
partition issue, the cultural exchange, and fear of cultural exchange, further complicated 
the relationship between the United States and Ireland.  Many were critical of 
“American Exceptionalism” and the idea that American culture was far superior to 
European culture. Europeans often equated American culture with being materialistic, 
mass-produced, and without heart.  While Americans valued popular culture, the Irish, 
particularly the artists, viewed any medium which they considered popular culture to be 
antithetical to high culture and against what the Irish are about—a long history of “high 
art” representation of Irish culture through literature:  stories and poetry.   
 Sean O’Faolain’s writing was characteristic of a kind of ambivalence regarding 
the Irish high culture.  While O’Faolain attacked the Irish romanticism of the country’s 
agrarian past and the sensibility that Ireland was distinct, special, and spiritually more 
exalted than the rest of the world, he ironically portrays the agrarian romanticism and 
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the importance of nationalism in The Promise of Barty O’Brien.  The film publicizes the 
importance of ERP, technical assistance, electrification and industrialization.  However, 
it also glorifies and romanticizes the rural Irish peasant in O’Faolain’s treatment of 
Barty’s family and their humble farm and perpetuates Irish nationalism through several 
references to the Easter Rebellion, which appeal to the Irish nationalist.  
 O’Faolain and Ireland’s continued obsession with nationalism reflects the 
difficulty of the Irish people and Irish officials in the Department of External Affairs to 
work with ERP officials and European officials without making the issue of 
nationalism, specifically partition, a condition in negotiating international affairs.  
Despite Irish nationalism and resistance to outside cultural, political, and economic 
influence, many Irish officials actively courted external political and cultural influences, 
but Ireland ultimately failed to meet the expectation of modernization inherent in both 
the film The Promise of Barty O’Brien and the ERP’s goals.  Ireland was in a unique 
position during this postwar, new world order.  Despite neutrality during World War II, 
political, and economic isolation, and antagonism towards U.S. intentions, Ireland 
became a part of the European Recovery Plan and actively tried to work with Europe 
while also attempting to figure out their identity as a post-colonial, newly-independent 
(albeit partitioned) nation.  But the issue of extreme nationalism and partition prevented 
Ireland from fully benefiting from ERP in the immediate years after the war.  Economic 
nationalism and isolation forced a mass emigration of the Irish people to the United 
Kingdom, the United States and elsewhere.  Ireland did not actively pursue integration 
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until the 1960s and 1970s, when Ireland finally joined the European Community (EC) 
in 1973.176   
The Promise of Barty O’Brien provides some context for illustrating the 
ambiguous relationships of the U.S. and Ireland, nationalism and a move toward 
industrializing a country that was very much still mired in the nineteenth century.   But 
it is this very temporal displacement, this living in the past, and this romanticizing of an 
agrarian lifestyle that prevented Ireland from emerging fully from isolation and 
impeded industrialization.  After all the efforts of MacBride and the Department of 
External Affairs to use the ERP to confront the issue of partition, Ireland was neutral 
and partitioned when the Marshall Plan began, and it remained so when the plan ended. 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                 
176 The European Community evolved into the European Union in 1993.  
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